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What does a conditional knowledge base entail? ∗
Daniel Lehmann† Menachem Magidor‡
Abstract
This paper presents a logical approach to nonmonotonic reasoning
based on the notion of a nonmonotonic consequence relation. A condi-
tional knowledge base, consisting of a set of conditional assertions of the
type if . . . then . . . , represents the explicit defeasible knowledge an agent
has about the way the world generally behaves. We look for a plausible
definition of the set of all conditional assertions entailed by a conditional
knowledge base. In a previous paper [17], S. Kraus and the authors de-
fined and studied preferential consequence relations. They noticed that
not all preferential relations could be considered as reasonable inference
procedures. This paper studies a more restricted class of consequence
relations, rational relations. It is argued that any reasonable nonmono-
tonic inference procedure should define a rational relation. It is shown
that the rational relations are exactly those that may be represented by
a ranked preferential model, or by a (non-standard) probabilistic model.
The rational closure of a conditional knowledge base is defined and shown
to provide an attractive answer to the question of the title. Global prop-
erties of this closure operation are proved: it is a cumulative operation.
It is also computationally tractable. This paper assumes the underlying
language is propositional.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Inference is the process of achieving explicit information that was only implicit
in the agent’s knowledge. Human beings are astoundingly good at infering
useful and very often reliable information from knowledge that seems mostly
irrelevant, sometimes erroneous and even self-contradictory. They are even bet-
ter at correcting inferences they learn to be in contradiction with reality. It is
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already a decade now that Artificial Intelligence has realized that the analysis
of models of such inferences was a major task.
Many nonmonotonic systems have been proposed as formal models of this
kind of inferences. The best known are probably: circumscription [22], the
modal systems of [23] and [24], default logic [29] and negation as failure [5]. An
up-to-date survey of the field of nonmonotonic reasoning may be found in [30].
Though each of these systems is interesting per se, it is not clear that any one of
them really captures the whole generality of nonmonotonic reasoning. Recently
(see in particular the panel discussion of [36]) a number of researchers expressed
their disappointment at existing systems and suggested that no purely logical
analysis could be satisfactory.
This work tries to contradict this pessimistic outlook. It takes a purely
logical approach, grounded in A. Tarski’s framework of consequence relations
[35] and studies the very general notion of a sensible conclusion. It seems that
this is a common ground that can be widely accepted: all reasonable inference
systems draw only sensible conclusions. On the other hand, as will be shown, the
notion of a sensible conclusion has a non-trivial mathematical theory and many
interesting properties are shared by all ways of drawing sensible conclusions.
The reader is referred to [17] for a full description of background, motivation
and the relationship of the present approach with previous work in Conditional
Logic. We only wish to add here that, even though the present work will be
compared explicitly only with previous work of E. Adams, some of the intuitions
developed here are related with intuitions exposed already in the first works on
Conditional Logic, such as [28] or [4]. The interested reader may find many
relevant articles in [15] and should in particular look at [14]. The main difference
between our approach and Conditional Logic is that we take the view that the
truth of a conditional assertion is necessary, i.e., does not depend on the state of
the world. For us, worlds give truth values to propositions but not to assertions,
preferential models give truth values to assertions, but not to propositions. The
models we propose are therefore much simpler than those previously proposed
in Conditional Logic and it is doubtful whether they can shed light on the very
complex questions of interest to the Conditional Logic community.
Notations and terminology conform with those of [17], but the present paper
is essentially self-contained. Preliminary versions of part of the material con-
tained in this paper appeared in [19, 18]. In [17] it was suggested that items of
default, i.e., defeasible information should be represented as conditional asser-
tions, i.e., pairs of formulas. For example, the information that birds normally
fly will be represented by the conditional assertion b ∼ f , where b and f are
propositional variables representing being a bird and flying respectively. A set
(finite or infinite) of conditional assertions is called a conditional knowledge base
(knowledge base, in short) and represents the defeasible knowledge an agent may
have. The fundamental question studied in this paper is the following: given
a knowledge base K, what are the conditional assertions that should be con-
sidered as entailed, i.e., logically implied, by K? We consider that an assertion
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α∼ β should be entailed by K if, on the basis of the defeasible information
contained in K and knowing that the proposition α is true, it would be sensible
to conclude (defeasibly) that β is true.
The question asked in the title and detailed just above has no simple answer
and has probably no unique answer good for everyone in every situation. It
may well be the case that, in different situations or for different domains of
knowledge, the pragmatically right answers to the question of the title differ.
This feeling has been recently expressed in [9]. The first part of this paper
defines the notion of a rational set of assertions and defends the thesis that
any reasonable answer to the question of the title must consist of such a set of
assertions.
Thesis 1 The set of assertions entailed by any set of assertions is rational.
The second part of the paper describes a specific construction, rational closure,
and shows that the rational closure of a set of assertions is rational. This
construction is then studied and its value as an answer to the question of the
title assessed. We think that, in many situations, this is an acceptable answer,
but do not claim that it provides an answer suitable to any situation. We
have just argued that such an answer probably does not exist. One of the
main interests of the rational closure construction is that it provides a proof of
the existence of some uniform, well-behaved and elegant way of answering the
question. In doing so, we develop criteria by which to judge possible answers.
We shall in particular consider properties of the mapping from K to the set
of all the assertions it entails and prove that our construction of the rational
closure satisfies them. This effort and these results have to be compared with
the essential absence, for the moment, of similar results about the systems of
nonmonotonic reasoning mentioned above.
1.2 Plan of this paper
We survey here the main parts of this paper. The introductions to the different
sections contain a detailed description. Section 2 is devoted to preferential
consequence relations. This family of relations was defined and studied in [17].
The first part of this section mainly recalls definitions and results of [17], its last
part presents deep new technical results on preferential entailment that will be
used in the sequel, but it may be skipped on a first reading. Section 3 presents
the restricted family of relations that is of interest to us: rational relations.
This family was first defined, but not studied, in [17, Section 5.4]. The main
result of this section is a representation theorem characterizing rational relations
in terms of ranked models. Section 4 shows that entailment with respect to
ranked models is exactly entailment with respect to preferential models and
provides an alternative proof of E. Adams’ [1] characterization of preferential
entailment in terms of his probabilistic semantics. Appendix B describes a
family of models based on non-standard (in the sense of A. Robinson) probability
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models and shows that these models provide another exact representation for
rational consequence relations. This provides us with a strong justification for
considering rational relations. Section 5 draws on all previous sections and is
the heart of this paper. It proposes an answer to the question of the title.
The notion of rational closure is first defined abstractly and global properties
proved. It is then showed that finite knowledge bases have a rational closure and
a model-theoretic construction is provided. An efficient algorithm is proposed
for computing the rational closure of a finite knowledge base. We then discuss
some examples, remark that rational closure does not provide for inheritance of
generic properties to exceptional classes, and finally propose a second thesis.
2 Preferential relations and models
2.1 Introduction
The first part of this section, i.e., Sections 2.2–2.3, recalls definitions and results
of [17] and provides an example (new) of a preferential relation that cannot
be defined by a well-founded model. Then, in Section 2.4, the definition and
some properties of preferential entailment are recalled from [17] and some new
remarks included. Preferential entailment is a fundamental notion that is used
throughout the paper. The last three sections are essentially independent of
each other. They present an in-depth study of preferential entailment. In a first
reading, they should probably be read only cursorily. The results of Section 2.5
expand on part of [18] and are used in Section 4.2. Section 2.6 presents a new
technique to study preferential entailment (i.e., ranking). It is fundamental
from Section 5.6 and onwards. Section 2.7 shows that preferential entailment
is in the class co-NP, and hence is an co-NP-complete problem. A preliminary
version of this last result appeared in [18].
2.2 Preferential relations
Our first step must be to define a language in which to express the basic propo-
sitions. In this paper Propositional Calculus is chosen. Let L be the set of well
formed propositional formulas (thereafter formulas) over a set of propositional
variables. If the set of propositional variables chosen is finite, we shall say that
L is logically finite. The classical propositional connectives will be denoted by
¬,∨,∧,→ and ↔. The connective → therefore denotes material implication.
Small Greek letters will be used to denote formulas.
A world is an assignment of truth values to the propositional variables. The
set U is the set of all worlds. The satisfaction of a formula by a world is defined
as usual. The notions of satisfaction of a set of formulas, validity of a formula
and satisfiability of a set of formulas are defined as usual. We shall write |= α
if α is valid, i.e., iff ∀u ∈ U , u |= α.
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If α and β are formulas then the pair α∼ β (read “from α sensibly con-
clude β”) is called a conditional assertion. A conditional assertion is a syntactic
object to which the reader may attach any meaning he wants, but the meaning
we attach to such an assertion, and against which the reader should check the
logical systems to be presented in the upcoming sections, is the following: if α
represents the information I have about the true state of the world, I will jump
to the conclusion that β is true. A conditional knowledge base is any set of
conditional assertions. Typically it is a finite set, but need not be so. Condi-
tional knowledge bases seem to provide a terse and versatile way of specifying
defeasible information. They correspond to the explicit information an agent
may have.
Certain well-behaved sets of conditional assertions will be deemed worthy of
being called consequence relations. We shall use the notation usual for binary
relations to describe consequence relations. So, if ∼ is a consequence relation,
α∼ β indicates that the pair 〈α, β〉 is in the consequence relation ∼ and α 6∼ β
indicates it is not in the relation. Consequence relations correspond to the
implicit information an intelligent agent may have. Consequence relations are
typically infinite sets.
Certain especially interesting properties of sets of conditional assertions (i.e.,
binary relations on L) will be described and discussed now. They are presented
in the form of inference rules. Consequence relations are expected to satisfy
those properties.
|= α↔ β , α∼ γ
β∼ γ
(Left Logical Equivalence) (1)
|= α→ β , γ∼ α
γ∼ β
(Right Weakening) (2)
α∼ α (Reflexivity) (3)
α∼ β , α∼ γ
α∼ β ∧ γ
(And) (4)
α∼ γ , β∼ γ
α ∨ β∼ γ
(Or) (5)
α∼ β , α∼ γ
α ∧ β∼ γ
(Cautious Monotonicity) (6)
Definition 1 A set of conditional assertions that satisfies all six properties
above is called a preferential consequence relation.
A more leisurely introduction with motivation may be found in [17] where
a larger family of consequence relations, that of cumulative relations, was also
5
studied. This family is closely related to the cumulative inference operations
studied by D. Makinson in [21]. The attentive reader of [17] may have noticed
that, there, we reserved ourselves an additional degree of freedom, that we have
denied ourselves here. There, we allowed U to be a subset of the set of all
worlds and considered the |= symbol appearing in Left Logical Equivalence
and in Right Weakening to be interpreted relatively to this subset. This was
felt necessary to deal with hard constraints. In this work, we shall suppose
that a hard constraint α is interpreted as the soft constraint, i.e., the assertion,
¬α ∼ false, which was recognized as equivalent to considering U to be the set
of all worlds satisfying α in [17, page 174]. The second proposal there, i.e., to
consider α to be part of the facts, would not be consistent with our treatment
of rational closure.
For the reader’s ease of mind we shall mention two important derived rules.
Both S and Cut are satisfied by any preferential relation.
α ∧ β∼ γ
α∼ β → γ
(S) (7)
α ∧ β∼ γ , α∼ β
α∼ γ
(Cut) (8)
The rule of Cut is presented here in a form that is not the most usual one. Notice,
in particular, that we require the left-hand side of the second assumption to be
part of the left-hand side of the first assumption. This version of Cut is close
to the original form proposed by G. Gentzen. The following form, more usually
used now, is not acceptable since it implies monotonicity.
α ∧ β∼ γ , α′∼ β
α ∧ α′ ∼ γ
(9)
2.3 Preferential models and representation theorem
The following definitions are also taken from [17] and justified there. We shall
define a class of models that we call preferential since they represent a slight
variation on those proposed in [33]. The differences are nevertheless technically
important.
Preferential models give a model-theoretic account of the way one performs
nonmonotonic inferences. The main idea is that the agent has, in his mind, a
partial ordering on possible states of the world. State s is less than state t, if, in
the agent’s mind, s is preferred to or more natural than t. The agent is willing
to conclude β from α, if all most natural states that satisfy α also satisfy β.
Some technical definitions are needed. Let U be a set and ≺ a strict partial
order on U , i.e., a binary relation that is antireflexive and transitive.
Definition 2 Let V ⊆ U . We shall say that t ∈ V is minimal in V iff there is
no s ∈ V , such that s ≺ t. We shall say that t ∈ V is a minimum of V iff for
every s ∈ V, s 6= t, we have t ≺ s.
6
Definition 3 Let V ⊆ U . We shall say that V is smooth iff ∀t ∈ V , either ∃s
minimal in V , such that s ≺ t or t is itself minimal in V .
We may now define the family of models we are interested in.
Definition 4 A preferential model W is a triple 〈S, l,≺〉 where S is a set,
the elements of which will be called states, l : S 7→ U assigns a world to each
state and ≺ is a strict partial order on S satisfying the following smoothness
condition: ∀α ∈ L, the set of states α̂
def
= {s | s ∈ S, s≡ α} is smooth, where ≡
is defined as s≡ α (read s satisfies α) iff l(s) |= α. The model W will be said to
be finite iff S is finite. It will be said to be well-founded iff 〈S,≺〉 is well-founded,
i.e., iff there is no infinite descending chain of states.
The smoothness condition is only a technical condition. It is satisfied in
any well-founded preferential model, and, in particular, in any finite model.
When the language L is logically finite, we could have limited ourselves to finite
models and forgotten the smoothness condition. Nevertheless, Lemma 1 will
show that, in the general case, for the representation result of Theorem 1 to
hold we could not have required preferential models to be well-founded. The
requirement that the relation ≺ be a strict partial order has been introduced
only because such models are nicer and the smoothness condition is easier to
check on those models, but the soundness result is true for the larger family
of models, where ≺ is just any binary relation (Definitions 2 and 3 also make
sense for any binary relation ≺). In such a case, obviously, the smoothness
condition cannot be dropped even for finite models. The completeness result
holds, obviously, also for the larger family, but is less interesting.
We shall now describe the consequence relation defined by a model.
Definition 5 Suppose a model W = 〈S, l,≺〉 and α, β ∈ L are given. The con-
sequence relation defined by W will be denoted by ∼W and is defined by:
α ∼W β iff for any s minimal in α̂, s≡ β.
If α ∼W β we shall say that the model W satisfies the conditional assertion
α∼ β, or that W is a model of α∼ β.
The following theorem characterizes preferential consequence relations.
Theorem 1 (Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor) A binary relation ∼ on L
is a preferential consequence relation iff it is the consequence relation defined
by some preferential model. If the language L is logically finite, then every
preferential consequence relation is defined by some finite preferential model.
The next result shows we could not have restricted ourselves to well-founded
models.
Lemma 1 There is a preferential relation that is defined by no well-founded
preferential model.
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Proof: Let L be the propositional calculus on the variables pi, i ∈ ω (ω is the set
of natural numbers). We shall consider the model W
def
= 〈V, l,≺〉 where V is the
set {si | i ∈ ω ∪ {∞}}, si ≺ sj iff i > j (i.e., there is an infinite descending chain
of states with a bottom element) and l(si)(pj) is true iff j ≥ i, for i ∈ ω ∪ {∞}
and j ∈ ω. The smoothness property is satisfied since the only subsets of V
that do not have a minimum are infinite sets A that do not contain s∞ and any
α ∈ L that is satisfied in all states of such a set A is also satisfied in s∞. The
modelW defines a preferential relation ∼W such that ∀i ∈ ω , pi ∼W pi+1 and
pi+1 ∼W ¬pi, but p0 6∼W false. But clearly, any preferential model defining
such a relation must contain an infinite descending chain of states.
We do not know of any direct characterization of those relations that may be
defined by well-founded preferential models. But Lemma 3 will show that many
relations may be defined by well-founded preferential models. It is clear, though,
that the canonical preferential model provided by the proof of Theorem 1 is
rarely well-founded. Consider, for example, the preferential closure of the empty
knowledge base on a logically infinite language L. It may be defined by some
well-founded preferential model (the order ≺ is empty). But its canonical model
is not well-founded (consider states whose second components are larger and
larger disjunctions). We may only make the following obvious remark: if the
underlying language L is logically finite, then all canonical models are well-
founded.
2.4 Preferential entailment
Now that we have a proof-theoretic definition of a class of relations, a class of
models and a representation theorem relating them, it is natural to put down
the following definition. It will serve us as a first approximate answer to the
question of the title.
Definition 6 The assertion A is preferentially entailed by K iff it is satisfied
by all preferential models of K. The set of all conditional assertions that are
preferentially entailed by K will be denoted by Kp. The preferential consequence
relation Kp is called the preferential closure of K.
In [17] it was noted that the characterization of preferential consequence rela-
tions obtained in Theorem 1 enables us to prove the following.
Theorem 2 Let K be a set of conditional assertions, and A a conditional as-
sertion. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. A is preferentially entailed by K, i.e., A ∈ Kp
2. A has a proof from K in the system P consisting of the Rules 1 to 6.
The following compactness result follows.
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Corollary 1 (compactness) K preferentially entails A iff a finite subset of
K does.
The following also follows from Theorem 2.
Corollary 2 The set Kp, considered as a consequence relation, is a preferential
consequence relation, therefore there is a preferential model that satisfies exactly
the assertions of Kp. If K is itself a preferential consequence relation then
K = Kp. The set Kp grows monotonically with K.
We see that the operationK 7→ Kp is a compact monotonic consequence opera-
tion in the sense of Tarski [35]. We have a particular interest in finite knowledge
bases. It is therefore useful to put down the following definition.
Definition 7 A preferential consequence relation is finitely generated iff it is
the preferential closure of a finite knowledge base.
Lemma 3 will show that finitely generated relations have interesting properties.
In [17], it was shown that any preferential relation defines a strict ordering on
formulas by: α < β iff α∨β∼ α and α∨β 6∼ β.
Definition 8 A preferential relation is well-founded iff the strict ordering re-
lation < it defines is well-founded.
The following is easy to show.
Lemma 2 A preferential relation is well-founded iff the canonical model built
in the proof of Theorem 1 is well-founded.
We noticed, at the end of Section 2.3, that not all preferential relations that
may be defined by well-founded preferential models are well-founded.
Lemma 3 Any finitely generated preferential relation is defined by some well-
founded preferential model.
Proof: Let K be any finite set of assertions. Let Li, i ∈ ω be an infinite se-
quence of larger and larger logically finite sublanguages of L such that every Li
contains all the formulas appearing in the assertions of K and such that L is
the union of the Li’s. By Theorem 1, for each i there is a finite preferential
model W ′i that defines the preferential closure of K over Li. Let Wi be the
finite preferential model (over L) obtained by extending the labeling function
of W ′i to the variables of L − Li in some arbitrary way. Clearly Wi is a prefer-
ential model of K. Let W be the structure obtained by putting all the Wi’s one
alongside the other (the partial ordering ≺ on W never relates states belonging
to Wi’s with different i’s). The structure W is well-founded, therefore satisfies
the smoothness condition and is a preferential model. Any assertion that is
preferentially entailed by K (over L) is satisfied by every Wi, and is therefore
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satisfied by W . For any assertion A that is not preferentially entailed by K one
may find a language Li large enough to include the formulas of A. Over Li, the
assertion A is not preferentially entailed by K, by Theorem 2, since a proof in
the small language is a proof in the larger one. Therefore W ′i does not satisfy
A. We conclude that Wi does not satisfy A and that W does not satisfy A.
2.5 Some properties of preferential entailment
The following result, Theorem 3, is new. It is important for several reasons.
It uses the semantic representation of Theorem 1 and a direct proof using only
proof-theoretic arguments seems difficult. It will be used in Section 4.2. Its
Corollary 3 should provide a starting point for the application to preferential
entailment of methods based on or related to resolution. First a definition.
Definition 9 If a formula α is such that α 6∼ false, we shall say that α is
consistent (for the consequence relation ∼ ). A formula is consistent for a
model iff it is consistent for the consequence relation defined by the model, or
equivalently iff there is a state in the model that satisfies α.
We shall now define a basic operation on preferential models. Suppose M is a
preferential model 〈V, l,≺〉. For s, t ∈ V we shall write s  t iff s ≺ t or s = t.
Let α be a formula and u ∈ V be a minimal element of α̂. Let ≺uα be the strict
partial order obtained from ≺ by making u a minimum of α̂, i.e., s ≺uα t iff s ≺ t
or s  u and there exists a state w ∈ α̂ such that w  t. The following lemma
describes the properties of the construction described above.
Lemma 4 The structure Muα
def
= 〈V, l,≺uα〉 is a preferential model. The conse-
quence relation defined by Muα extends the consequence relation defined by M .
In this model u is a minimum of α̂. Both models have the same set of consistent
formulas.
Proof: It is easy to see that ≺uα is irreflexive and transitive. It is also easy to
see that, under ≺uα, u is a minimum of α̂. We want to show now that, for any
β ∈ L, the set β̂ is smooth, under ≺uα. Let s ∈ β̂. Since β̂ is smooth under ≺,
there is a state t, minimal under ≺ in β̂ such that t  s. If t is still minimal
in β̂ under ≺uα, then we are done. If not, there is some state v ∈ β̂ such that
v  u and v ≺uα s. Since β̂ is smooth under ≺, there is a state w, minimal in
β̂ under ≺ such that w ≺ v. Since w ≺ u, w must be minimal in β̂ also under
≺uα. But w ≺
u
α s. We have shown that β̂ is smooth under ≺
u
α. To see that
the consequence relation defined by Muα extends the one defined by M , just
notice that, since ≺uα extends ≺, all minimal elements under the former are also
minimal under the latter. Lastly, since M and Muα have exactly the same set
of worlds and the same labeling function, they define exactly the same set of
consistent formulas.
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Theorem 3 Let K be a knowledge base and α∼ β an assertion that is not pref-
erentially entailed by K. The formulas that are inconsistent for the preferential
closure of K ∪ {α∼ ¬β} are those that are inconsistent for the preferential
closure of K.
Proof: Suppose that α∼ β is not preferentially entailed by K. Then, let
W = 〈S, l,≺〉 be the preferential model the existence of which is guaranteed by
Theorem 1 and that defines Kp. The model W does not satisfy α∼ β. There is
therefore a minimal element s ∈ S of α̂ that does not satisfy β. Consider now
the model W ′
def
= W sα. By Lemma 4 this is a preferential model that satisfies
all the assertions satisfied by W , therefore it satisfies all the assertions of K.
Since s is the only minimal element of α̂, it satisfies K ∪ {α∼ ¬β}. Suppose γ
is inconsistent for (K ∪ {α∼ ¬β})p. Then it must be inconsistent for W ′. By
Lemma 4 it is inconsistent for W , therefore inconsistent for Kp.
Corollary 3 Let K be a conditional knowledge base and α∼ β a conditional
assertion. The assertion α∼ β is preferentially entailed by K iff the assertion
α∼ false is preferentially entailed by K ∪ {α ∼ ¬β}.
Proof: The only if part follows immediately from the soundness of the And
rule. The if part, follows immediately from Theorem 3.
2.6 The rank of a formula
In this section, we introduce a powerful tool for studying preferential entailment.
Given a knowledge base, we shall attach an ordinal, its rank, to every formula.
We shall prove an important result concerning those ranks, and, in particular,
show that a knowledge base K and its preferential closure Kp define the same
ranks.
Definition 10 Let K be a conditional knowledge base (i.e., a set of conditional
assertions) and α a formula. The formula α is said to be exceptional for K
iff K preferentially entails the assertion true ∼ ¬α. The conditional assertion
A
def
= α∼ β is said to be exceptional for K iff its antecedent α is exceptional for
K.
The set of all assertions of K that are exceptional for K will be denoted by
E(K). Notice that E(K) ⊆ K. If all assertions of K are exceptional for K,
i.e., if K is equal to E(K), we shall say that K is completely exceptional. The
empty knowledge base is completely exceptional. Notice that, in the definition
above, K may be replaced by its preferential closure Kp.
Given a conditional knowledge base K (not necessarily finite), we shall now
define by ordinal induction an infinite non-increasing sequence of subsets of K.
Let C0 be equal to K. For any successor ordinal τ + 1, Cτ+1 will be E(Cτ ) and
11
for any limit ordinal τ , Cτ is the intersection of all Cρ for ρ < τ . It is clear
that, after some point on, all C’s are equal and completely exceptional (they
may be empty, but need not be so). We shall say that a formula α has rank
τ (for K) iff τ is the least ordinal for which α is not exceptional for Cτ . A
formula that is exceptional for all Cτ ’s is said to have no rank. Notice that
such a formula is exceptional for a totally exceptional knowledge base. The
following is a fundamental lemma on preferential entailment. It says that, as
far as preferential entailment is concerned, non-exceptional assertions cannot
help deriving exceptional assertions. The notion of rank defined above proves
to be a powerful tool for studying preferential entailment.
Lemma 5 Let τ be an ordinal. Let K be a conditional knowledge base and A
a conditional assertion whose antecedent has rank larger or equal to τ (or has
no rank). Then A is preferentially entailed by C0 iff it is preferentially entailed
by Cτ .
Proof: The if part follows from the fact that Cτ is a subset of C0. The only
if part is proved by induction on the length of the proof of A from C0. If
the proof has length one, i.e., A is obtained by Reflexivity or is an assertion
of C0, then the result is obvious. If the last step of the proof is obtained
by Right Weakening or And, the result follows from a trivial use of the
induction hypothesis. If the last step of the proof is obtained by Left Logical
Equivalence, the result follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact
that, if α and α′ are logically equivalent then α and α′ have the same rank. If
the last step is a use of Or, and A is of the form α ∨ β ∼ γ then just remark
that the rank of the disjunction α ∨ β is the smaller of the ranks of α and β.
Both α and β have therefore a rank larger or equal to τ and one concludes by the
induction hypothesis. If the last step is a use of Cautious Monotonicity, and
A is of the form α ∧ β ∼ γ, where α∼ β and α∼ γ are preferentially entailed
(with short proofs) by C0, let σ be the rank of α. By the induction hypothesis
Cσ preferentially entails α∼ β. Since α is not exceptional for Cσ, we conclude
that α ∧ β is not exceptional for Cσ, and therefore has rank σ. But α ∧ β has
rank larger or equal to τ . Therefore τ ≤ σ. The formula α has rank larger or
equal to τ and we may apply the induction hypothesis to conclude that both
α∼ β and α∼ γ are preferentially entailed by Cρ.
Lemma 6 Let K and K′ be knowledge bases such that K ⊆ K′ ⊆ Kp. For any
formula, the rank it is given by K′ is equal to the rank it is given by K.
Proof: Using Lemma 5, one shows by ordinal induction that Cτ ⊆ C′τ ⊆ (Cτ )
p.
The following definition will be useful in Section 5.6.
Definition 11 A knowledge base K is said to be admissible iff all formulas that
have no rank for K are inconsistent for K.
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We shall immediately show that many knowledge bases are admissible.
Lemma 7 If the preferential closure of K is defined by some well-founded pref-
erential model, then K is admissible. In particular, any finite knowledge base is
admissible.
Proof: We have noticed, in Lemma 6 that ranks are stable under the the
replacement of a knowledge base by its preferential closure. Let P be the pref-
erential closure of K. Suppose P is defined by some well-founded preferential
modelW . Suppose α has no rank. We must show that no state ofW satisfies α.
As noticed above, there is an ordinal τ such that Cτ is completely exceptional
and α is exceptional for Cτ . We shall show that no state ofW satisfies a formula
that is exceptional for Cτ . Indeed, if there were such a state, there would be
such a minimal state, s, since W is well-founded. But W is a model of Cτ and
no state below s satisfy any antecedent of Cτ , since Cτ is totally exceptional.
Therefore the preferential model consisting of s alone is a model of Cτ . But, in
a model of Cτ , no minimal state satisfy a formula that is exceptional for Cτ . A
contradiction. It follows now from Lemma 3 that any finite knowledge base is
admissible.
2.7 Computing preferential entailment
This section is devoted to the study of the computational complexity of prefer-
ential entailment. It is not needed in the sequel. We shall explain in Section 3.5
why preferential entailment is not the right notion of entailment to answer the
question of the title, nevertheless preferential entailment is a central concept and
it is therefore worthwhile studying its computational complexity. The results
here are quite encouraging: the problem is in co-NP, i.e., in the same polynomial
class as the problem of deciding whether a propositional formula is valid.
Lemma 8 Let K be a finite conditional knowledge base and α∼ β a conditional
assertion that is not preferentially entailed by K. There is a finite totally (i.e.,
linearly) ordered preferential model of K no state of which satisfies α except the
top state. This top state satisfies α and does not satisfy β.
Proof: Let L′ ⊆ L be a logically finite language, large enough to contain α,
β and all the assertions of K. Let us now consider L′ to be our language of
reference. Clearly, α∼ β is not preferentially entailed by K, since a proof over
the smaller language is a proof over the larger language. By Theorem 1, there is
a finite preferential model W (over L′) of K that does not satisfy α∼ β. In W ,
there is therefore a state s, minimal in α̂, that satisfies α but does not satisfy
β. Consider the submodel W ′ obtained by deleting all states of W that are not
below or equal to s. It is clearly a finite preferential model of K, with a top
state that satisfies α but not β. Let V be obtained by imposing on the states
of W ′ any total ordering that respects the partial ordering of W ′. Since there
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are only finitely many states in V , the smoothness condition is verified and V
is a preferential model (on L′). It is a model of K but not of A. Now we may
extend the labeling function of V to the propositional variables of L that are
not in L′ any way we want, to get the model requested. Notice that the model
obtained satisfies the smoothness condition because it is finite.
Theorem 4 There is a non-deterministic algorithm that, given a finite set K
of conditional assertions and a conditional assertion A, checks that A is not
preferentially entailed by K. The running time of this algorithm is polynomial
in the size of K (sum of the sizes of its elements) and A.
Proof: Let K be {γi ∼ δi}
N
i=1. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , N} be a set of indices. We
shall define: ϕI
def
=
∨
i∈I γi and ψI
def
=
∧
i∈I (γi → δi). A sequence is a sequence
of pairs (Ii, fi) for i = 0, . . . , n, where Ii ⊆ I and fi is a world. Let α and β be
in L.
Definition 12 A sequence (Ii, fi), i = 0, . . . , n, is a witness for α ∼ β (we
mean a witness that α ∼ β is not preferentially entailed by K ) iff
1. fk |= ψIk , ∀k = 0, . . . , n
2. fk |= ϕIk , ∀k = 0, . . . , n− 1
3. Ik+1 = Ik
⋂
{j | fk 6|= γj}, ∀k = 0, . . . , n− 1
4. I0 = {1, . . . , N}
5. fk 6|= α, ∀k = 0, . . . , n− 1
6. fn |= α ∧ ¬β.
We must check that: witnesses are short and a conditional assertion has a
witness iff it is not preferentially entailed by K. For the first point, just remark
that, for k = 0, . . . , n− 1 the inclusion Ik ⊃ Ik+1 is strict because of items 3
and 2. The length of the sequence is therefore bounded by the number of
assertions in K. But, each pair has a short description. For the second point,
suppose first there is a witness for α ∼ β. Then the ranked modelW consisting
of worlds f0, . . . , fn where fk ≺ fk+1 for k = 0, . . . , n− 1 satisfies K but not
α ∼ β. That it does not satisfy α ∼ β is clear from items 5 and 6. Let us
check that W satisfies γi ∼ δi. If none of the fk’s, k = 0, . . . , n satisfies γi then
W satisfies γi ∼ η for any η in L. Suppose therefore that j is the smallest k for
which fj |= γi. We must show that fj |= δi. But, by items 4 and 3 i ∈ Ij and
by item 1, fi |= δi.
Suppose now that α ∼ β is not preferentially entailed by some given finite
K. By Lemma 8, there is a finite linearly ordered model W of K, no state of
which satisfies α, except the top state that is labeled by a world m that satisfies
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α ∧ ¬β. Let I0
def
= {1, . . . , N}. It is easy to see that (remark 1): if V is any
preferential model of K, for any set I ⊆ I0, V satisfies ϕI ∼ ψI . Let us now
consider first the set ̂α ∨ ϕI0 . It cannot be empty, therefore it has a unique
minimal state. Let f0 be the label of this state. We must consider two cases.
First suppose that f0 |= α. Then f0 is minimal in α̂ and therefore must be m.
In such a case (I0,m) is a witness. The only thing to check is that item 1 is
satisfied. Indeed either m |= ϕI0 and we conclude by remark 1 or ϕ̂I0 = ∅ and m
satisfies none of the γi’s. Let us deal now with the case f0 6|= α. We shall build
a sequence beginning by (I0,m). Since m does not satisfy α, it must satisfy ϕI0 ,
which takes care of item 2. Remark 1 takes care of item 1. Let us now define
I1 = I0
⋂
{j | f0 6|= γj}. I1 is strictly smaller than I0. We may now consider the
set ̂α ∨ ϕI1 . It is not empty and therefore has a unique minimal element and
we may, in this way, go on and build a proof for α ∼ β.
Since it is clear that preferential non-entailment is at least as hard as sat-
isfiability (consider assertions with antecedent true), we conclude that it is an
NP-complete problem, i.e., that preferential entailment is co-NP-complete. A
remark of J. Dix that will be explained at the end of Section 5.8 shows that pref-
erential entailment is reducible to the computation of rational closure and that
this reduction, when applied to Horn formulas, requires only the consideration
of Horn formulas. It follows that, if we restrict ourselves to Horn assertions,
computing preferential entailment has only polynomial complexity.
3 Rationality
3.1 Introduction
In this section we explain why not all preferential relations represent reasonable
nonmonotonic inference procedures. We present some additional principles of
nonmonotonic reasoning and discuss them. Those principles are structurally
different from the rules of preferential reasoning, since they are not of the type:
deduce some assertion from some other assertions. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present
weak principles. Some results are proven concerning those principles. Deeper
results on those principles, found after a first version of this paper had been cir-
culated, appear in [11]. Our central principle is presented in Section 3.4. Those
principles were first described in [17] but the technical results presented here are
new. In 3.5, the value of preferential entailment as an answer to the question of
the title is discussed. Our conclusion is that it is not a satisfactory answer, since
it does not provide us with a rational relation. Then, in Section 3.6, a restricted
family of preferential models, the family of ranked models, is presented and a
representation theorem is proved. The result is central to this paper but the
proof of the representation theorem may be skipped on a first reading. The
representation theorem appeared in [19]. The family of ranked models is closely
related to, but different from, a family studied in [7] and Section 3.7 explains
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the differences.
3.2 Negation Rationality
In [17, Section 5.4], it was argued that not all preferential consequence relations
represented reasonable inference operations. Three rationality properties were
discussed there, and it was argued that all three were desirable. Those properties
do not lend themselves to be presented as Horn rules (deduce the presence of an
assertion in a relation from the presence of other assertions) but have the form:
deduce the absence of an assertion from the absence of other assertions. All of
them are implied byMonotonicity. The reader may find the discussion of [17]
useful. Here technical results will be described. The first property considered
is the following.
α ∧ γ 6∼ β , α ∧ ¬γ 6∼ β
α 6∼ β
(Negation Rationality) (10)
Lemma 9 There is a preferential relation that does not satisfy Negation Ra-
tionality.
Proof: Take a preferential model containing four states: si, i = 0, . . . 3, with
s0 ≺ s1 and s2 ≺ s3. Let the even states be the only states satisfying q and s0
and s3 be the only states satisfying p. One easily verifies that the consequence
relation defined by this model is such that true ∼ q, but p 6∼ q and ¬p 6∼ q.
No semantic characterization of relations satisfying Negation Rationality
is known. It has been shown in [17] that the consequence relation defined by
Circumscription does not always satisfy Negation Rationality.
3.3 Disjunctive Rationality
The next property is the following.
α 6∼ γ , β 6∼ γ
α ∨ β 6∼ γ
(Disjunctive Rationality) (11)
We may prove the following.
Lemma 10 Any preferential relation that satisfies Disjunctive Rationality
satisfies Negation Rationality.
Proof: Suppose α ∧ γ 6∼ β and α ∧ ¬γ 6∼ β. By Disjunctive Rationality,
we conclude that α ∧ γ ∨ α ∧ ¬γ 6∼ β. We conclude by Left Logical Equiva-
lence.
Lemma 11 There is a preferential relation that satisfies Negation Rational-
ity but does not satisfy Disjunctive Rationality.
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Proof: Let us consider the following preferential model W . The model W has
four states: a0, a1, b0, b1. The ordering is: a0 ≺ a1 and b0 ≺ b1. The language
has three propositional variables: p, q and r. The two states a1 and b1 (the top
states) are labeled with the same world that satisfies only p and q. State a0
is labeled with the world that satisfies only p and r and the state b0 with the
world that satisfies only q and r. The preferential relation defined by W does
not satisfyDisjunctive Rationality but satisfiesWeak Rationality. For the
first claim, notice that: p ∨ q ∼W r but p 6∼W r and q 6∼W r. For the second
claim, suppose α ∼W γ, but α ∧ β 6∼W γ. Then it must be the case that there
is a minimal state of α̂ that does not satisfy β and, above it, a state that is
minimal in α̂ ∧ β. This last state must be labeled by a world that is the label
of no minimal state of α̂. Therefore, α̂ must contain all four states of W , and
α̂ ∧ β must contain either the two top states alone or the two top states and
one of the bottom states. In each case it is easy to see that α ∧ ¬β ∼W γ since
the minimal states of ̂α ∧ ¬β are all also minimal in α̂.
No semantic characterization of relations satisfying Disjunctive Rational-
ity was known at the time this paper was elaborated. M. Freund [10] has now
provided a very elegant such characterization together with an alternative proof
of our Theorem 5; the canonical model he builds is essentially the same as ours.
3.4 Rational Monotonicity
The last property is the following.
α ∧ β 6∼ γ , α 6∼ ¬β
α 6∼ γ
(Rational Monotonicity) (12)
This rule is similar to the thesis CV of conditional logic (see [25]). The reader
is referred to [17, Section 5.4] for a discussion of our claim that reasonable con-
sequence relations should satisfy Rational Monotonicity. Some researchers
in Conditional Logic (J. Pollock in particular) have objected to CV as a valid
thesis for (mainly subjunctive) conditionals. Echoes of this debate may be found
in [12, end of Section 4.4]. The objections to CV that hold in the conditional
logic framework do not hold for us, though their consideration is recommended
to the reader. The most attractive feature of Rational Monotonicity is prob-
ably that it says that an agent should not have to retract any previous defeasible
conclusion when learning about a new fact the negation of which was not previ-
ously derivable. In [32], K. Satoh aptly decided to call nonmonotonic reasoning
that validates Rational Monotonicity lazy. The rule of Rational Mono-
tonicity should be distinguished from the following rule, which is satisfied by
any preferential relation.
α ∧ β ∼ ¬γ , α 6∼ ¬β
α 6∼ γ
(13)
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Definition 13 A rational consequence relation is a preferential relation that
satisfies Rational Monotonicity.
Two different representation theorems will be proved about rational relations,
in Sections 3.6 and in Appendix B. The last one seems to provide evidence that
reasonable inference procedures validate Rational Monotonicity and that all
rational relations represent reasonable inference procedures.
Lemma 12 A rational relation satisfies Disjunctive Rationality.
Proof: Suppose α 6∼ γ and β 6∼ γ. By Left Logical Equivalence we have
(α ∨ β) ∧ α 6∼ γ. If we have α ∨ β 6∼ ¬α, then we could conclude by Rational
Monotonicity that α ∨ β 6∼ γ. Suppose then that α ∨ β ∼ ¬α. If we had
α ∨ β ∼ γ, we would conclude by preferential reasoning that β 6∼ γ.
Lemma 13 (David Makinson) There is a preferential relation satisfying Dis-
junctive Rationality that is not rational.
Proof: We shall build a preferential model that defines a consequence relation
satisfying Disjunctive Rationality but not Rational Monotonicity. Let L
be the propositional calculus on the three variables: p0, p1, p2. Let U contain
all propositional worlds on those variables. Let S contain three elements: si for
i = 0, 1, 2 and l(si) satisfy only pi. The partial order ≺ is such that s1 ≺ s2
and no other pair satisfies the relation. This defines a preferential model W .
First we shall show that the consequence relation defined by W does not satisfy
Rational Monotonicity. Indeed, we have both p0 ∨ p1 ∨ p2 ∼W ¬p2 and
p0 ∨ p1 ∨ p2 6∼W p1. Nevertheless, we also have ¬p1 ∧ (p0 ∨ p1 ∨ p2) 6∼W ¬p2.
Let us show now that any preferential model that does not satisfy Disjunctive
Rationality must have at least 4 states. Suppose α ∨ β ∼ γ, but α 6∼ γ and
β 6∼ γ. The last two assumptions imply the existence of states a and b, minimal
in α̂ and β̂ respectively and that do not satisfy γ, and therefore are not minimal
in α̂ ∨ β. Those states are different, since any state minimal in both α̂ and β̂
would be minimal in α̂ ∨ β. By the smoothness condition there must be a state
a′ minimal in α̂ ∨ β and such that a′ ≺ a. Clearly a′ satisfies γ and does not
satisfy α (since a is minimal in α̂) but satisfies β. Similarly there must be a
state b′ minimal in α̂ ∨ β and such that b′ ≺ b and b′ satisfies γ and does not
satisfy β, but satisfies α. It is left to show that all four states are different. We
have already noticed that a 6= b. The states a′ and b′ satisfy γ and are therefore
different from a and b. But b′ satisfies α and a′ does not and therefore a′ 6= b′.
3.5 Discussion of Preferential Entailment
We may now assess preferential entailment as a possible answer to the question
of the title. Corollary 2 explains why the notion of preferential entailment
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cannot be the one we are looking for: the relation Kp can be any preferential
relation and is not in general rational. For typical K’s, Kp fails to satisfy a
large number of instances of Rational Monotonicity and is therefore highly
unsuitable. One particularly annoying instance of this is the following. Suppose
a conditional knowledge base K contains one single assertion p ∼ q where p
and q are different propositional variables. Let r be a propositional variable,
different from p and q. We intuitively expect the assertion p ∧ r ∼ q to follow
from K. The rationale for that has been discussed extensively in the literature
and boils down to this: since we have no information whatsoever about the
influence of r on objects satisfying p it is sensible to assume that it has no
influence and that there are normal p-objects that satisfy r. The normal p ∧ r-
objects are therefore normal p-objects and have all the properties enjoyed by
normal p-objects. Nevertheless it is easy to check that p ∧ r ∼ q is not in Kp.
The problem lies, at least in part, with the fact thatKp is not rational, since any
rational relation containing p ∼ q , must contain p ∧ r ∼ q unless it contains
p ∼ ¬r.
In conclusion, it seems that the set of conditional assertions entailed by
K should be larger and more monotonic than the set Kp. It should also be
rational. This question will be brought up again in Section 5 and a solution will
be proposed.
3.6 Ranked models and a representation theorem for ra-
tional relations
In this section a family of preferential models will be defined and it will be
shown that the relations defined by models of this family are exactly the rational
relations.
Lemma 14 If ≺ is a partial order on a set V , the following conditions are
equivalent.
1. for any x, y, z ∈ V if x 6≺ y, y 6≺ x and z ≺ x, then z ≺ y
2. for any x, y, z ∈ V if x ≺ y, then, either z ≺ y or x ≺ z
3. for any x, y, z ∈ V if x 6≺ y and y 6≺ z, then x 6≺ z
4. there is a totally ordered set Ω (the strict order on Ω will be denoted by
<) and a function r : V 7→ Ω (the ranking function) such that s ≺ t iff
r(s) < r(t).
The proof is simple and will not be given. A partial order satisfying any of the
conditions of Lemma 14 will be called modular (this terminology is proposed
in [12] as an extension of the notion of modular lattice of [13]).
Definition 14 A ranked model W is a preferential model 〈V, l,≺〉 for which the
strict partial order ≺ is modular.
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Those models are called ranked since the effect of function r of property 4 of
Lemma 14 is to rank the states: a state of smaller rank being more normal than
a state of higher rank. We shall always suppose that a ranked model W comes
equipped with a totally ordered set Ω and a ranking function r. Notice that
we still require W to satisfy the smoothness condition. It is easy to see that
for any subset T of V and any t ∈ T , t is minimal in T iff r(t) is the minimum
of the set r(T ). It follows that all minimal elements of T have the same image
by r. The smoothness condition is then equivalent to the following: for any
formula α ∈ L, if α̂ is not empty, the set r(α̂) has a minimum. The smoothness
condition is always verified if Ω is a well-ordered set. The reader may check that
the preferential model W defined in the proof of Lemma 1 is ranked (it is even
totally ordered). It follows that there are rational relations that are defined by
no well-founded ranked model. The following is a soundness result.
Lemma 15 If W is a ranked model, the consequence relation ∼W it defines is
rational.
Proof: It is enough to show that ∼W satisfies Rational Monotonicity.
For this, the smoothness condition is not needed; it is needed, though, for
the soundness of Cautious Monotonicity. Suppose W is a ranked model.
We shall use the notations of Definition 14. Suppose also that α ∼W γ and
α 6∼W ¬β. From this last assumption we conclude that there is a minimal
element of α̂ that satisfies β. Let t ∈ V be such a state. Let s ∈ V be a minimal
element of α̂ ∧ β. Since t ∈ α̂ ∧ β, t 6≺ s and r(s) ≤ r(t). But this implies that s
is minimal in α̂: any state u such that u ≺ s satisfies r(u) < r(s) and therefore
r(u) < r(t) and u ≺ t. Since α ∼W γ, s≡ γ.
We shall show now that the converse of Lemma 15 holds. We shall first
mention four derived rules of preferential logic. In fact the first three of these
rules are even valid in cumulative logic (see [17, Section 3]). Their proof (either
proof-theoretic or model-theoretic) is straightforward and is omitted.
Lemma 16 The following rules are derived rules of preferential logic:
α ∼ false
α ∧ β ∼ false
(14)
α ∨ β ∼ ¬β
α ∼ ¬β
(15)
α ∨ β ∨ γ ∼ ¬α ∧ ¬β
β ∨ γ ∼ ¬β
(16)
α ∨ β ∼ ¬α
α ∨ β ∨ γ ∼ ¬α
(17)
We shall now derive a property of rational relations.
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Lemma 17 If ∼ is a rational relation, then the following rule is valid:
α ∨ γ ∼ ¬α , β ∨ γ 6∼ ¬β
α ∨ β ∼ ¬α
(18)
Proof: From the first hypothesis, by Rule 17 one deduces α ∨ β ∨ γ ∼ ¬α.
From the second hypothesis, by Rule 16 one deduces α ∨ β ∨ γ 6∼ ¬(α ∨ β). If
one applies now Rational Monotonicity, one gets the desired conclusion.
For the completeness result, we proceed in the style of L. Henkin. Complete-
ness proofs in this style have been used in conditional logics since [34]. Since a
number of technical lemmas are needed, we have relegated them to Appendix A
and state here the characterization theorem.
Theorem 5 A binary relation ∼ on L is a rational consequence relation iff it
is the consequence relation defined by some ranked model. If the language L is
logically finite, then every rational consequence relation is defined by some finite
ranked model.
Proof: The if part is Lemma 15. For the only if part, let ∼ be a consequence
relation satisfying the rules of R. The relation ∼ defines a structure W as de-
scribed in Appendix A. By Lemmas 41 and 36, W is a ranked model. We claim
that, for any α, β ∈ L, α ∼ β iff α ∼W β. Suppose first α ∼ β. By Lemma 42,
if < m, β > is minimal in α̂, then m is normal for α. We conclude that m |= β
and < m, β > ≡ β. Therefore α ∼W β. Suppose now that α ∼W β. Let m be
a normal world for α. By Corollary 7, the pair < m,α > is minimal in α̂ and
therefore m |= β. All normal worlds for α therefore satisfy β and Lemma 8 of
[17] implies that α ∼ β. For the last sentence of the theorem, notice that, if
the language L is logically finite, the model W is finite.
As we remarked just prior to Lemma 15, the theorem would not hold had
we required models to be well-founded.
3.7 Comparison with Delgrande’s work
The system of proof-rules and the models presented above may be compared
with the results of J. Delgrande in [7, 8]. The general thrust is very similar
but differences are worth noticing. A first difference is in the language used.
Delgrande’s language differs from this paper’s in three respects: his work is
specifically tailored to first-order predicate calculus, whereas this work deals
with propositional calculus; he allows negation and disjunction of conditional
assertions, which are not allowed in this paper; he allows nesting of conditional
operators in the language, though his completeness result is formulated only
for unnested formulas. Therefore Delgrande’s central completeness result in
[7], only shows that any proposition in which there is no nesting of conditional
operators (let us call those propositions flat) that is valid has a proof from the
axioms and rules of his system. But this proof may use propositions that are
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not flat. The completeness results reported here show that valid assertions have
proofs that contain only flat assertions.
A second difference is that Delgrande’s logical system is different from ours:
Delgrande’s logic N does not contain Cautious Monotonicity. Our class of
ranked models is more restricted than his class of models: our models are re-
quired to obey the smoothness condition and Delgrande’s are not. One may
also notice that our logic enjoys the finite model property, but Delgrande’s does
not. This difference between our two logical systems may sound insignificant
when one remarks that many instances of the rule of Cautious Monotonic-
ity may be derived from Rational Monotonicity, and are therefore valid
in Delgrande’s system N. What we mean is that if α ∼ β and α ∼ γ then,
if α 6∼ ¬β one may conclude α ∧ β ∼ γ by Rational Monotonicity rather
than by Cautious Monotonicity. But if α ∼ ¬β, and therefore α ∼ false
one cannot conclude. The Rule 14 is sound in preferential logic but not in
Delgrande’s logic. A proof will soon be given. We want to remark here that
Rule (14) is very natural, since the meaning of α ∼ false is that if α is true
than anything may be true. It therefore means that it is absolutely unthinkable
that α be true. In such a case we would expect α ∧ β to be also absolutely
unthinkable.
Let us show now that Rule (14) is not valid for Delgrande’s structures. Con-
sider the following structure. Let the set V consists of one infinite descending
chain: ≺ is a total ordering. Suppose now that the top element of V is the only
state that satisfies the propositional variable p. In this structure t̂rue is V and
has no minimal element, therefore true∼ false. But p̂ consists only of the top
element and has a minimal point and therefore p 6∼ false. We have shown that
the Rule 14 is not valid for Delgrande’s structures. This example also shows
that Delgrande’s logic does not posses the finite model property.
A third difference is that his definition of the set of conditional assertions
entailed by a conditional knowledge base is different from the one presented
here, at least at first sight.
4 Ranked entailment
4.1 Introduction
After having defined the family of relations and the family of models we are
interested in, we proceed to study the notion of entailment provided by those
models. Our main result is presented in 4.2. It is negative, in the sense that this
entailment is equivalent to preferential entailment. A preliminary version of this
result may be found in [19]. The collapsing of the two notions of entailment,
as opposed to the two different classes of relations represented, sheds a new
light on the results of [1]. Section 4.3 describes the probabilistic semantics
given to preferential entailment by E. Adams in [1] and shows how the result of
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Section 4.2 provides an alternative proof for Adams’ results. The results of this
section were contained in [19].
4.2 Ranked entailment is preferential entailment
In the discussion of Section 3.5, we expressed the wish that the set of assertions
entailed by a conditional knowledge base K be rational and larger than Kp.
A natural candidate would be the set of all assertions that are satisfied in all
ranked models that satisfy the assertions ofK. This is an intersection of rational
relations. This proposal fails in a spectacular way. Problems with this proposal
have been noted in [8, Section 4]. It is also easy to see that the intersection of
rational relations may fail to be rational. Theorem 6 shows this failure to be
total.
Lemma 18 Let E be any preferential relation. There exists a rational extension
of E for which a formula is inconsistent only if it is inconsistent for E .
Proof: Let us choose some enumeration of triples of formulas α, β and γ in
which every triple appears an unbounded number of times. Let K0 be equal
to E . At every step i we define Ki+1 in the following way. Let α, β and γ
be the triple enumerated at step i. Unless Ki contains the pair α∼ γ but
contains neither α ∧ β ∼ γ nor α∼ ¬β, we shall take Ki+1 to be equal to Ki.
If Ki satisfies the condition above, we shall take Ki+1 to be the preferential
closure of Ki ∪ {α∼ β}. Notice that, by Cautious Monotonicity, α ∧ β ∼ γ
will enter Ki+1. It is clear that the Ki’s provide an increasing sequence of
preferential extensions of E . Let K∞ be the union of all the Ki’s. Clearly K∞
is a preferential extension of E . By construction, and since we took care of
removing all counter-examples to the rule of Rational Monotonicity, K∞ is
a rational consequence relation. We claim that a formula α is inconsistent for
K∞ (i.e., α∼ false is in K∞) only if it is inconsistent already for E . Indeed, if
α is inconsistent for K∞ it must be inconsistent for some Ki, but Theorem 3
shows that, by construction, all Ki’s have the same inconsistent formulas.
Theorem 6 If the assertion A is satisfied by all ranked models that satisfy all
the assertions of K, then it is satisfied by all preferential such models.
Proof: Let A
def
= δ∼ ε be as in the hypotheses. Let E be the rational exten-
sion of the preferential closure of K ∪ {δ∼ ¬ε}, whose existence is asserted by
Lemma 18. The assertion δ∼ ε is in E since it is in any rational relation that
extends K, by Theorem 5. Since δ∼ ¬ε is obviously in E , we conclude that
δ is inconsistent for E and therefore inconsistent for the preferential closure of
K ∪ {δ∼ ¬ε}. By Corollary 3, A is preferentially entailed by K.
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4.3 Comparison with Adams’ probabilistic entailment
In this section we shall show that ranked models are closely related to Adams’
probabilistic entailment described in [1]. Theorem 6, then, provides an alter-
native proof of Adams’ axiomatic characterization of probabilistic entailment.
There are some technical differences between Adams’ framework and ours since
Adams insists on allowing formulas as conditional assertions: for him the for-
mula α is a synonym for true ∼ α. We also insist on studying infinite knowl-
edge bases whenever possible, where Adams restricts himself to finite knowledge
bases.
A probability assignment for the language L is a probability measure on
L yielded by some probability measure given on U . E. Adams proposed the
following definitions.
Definition 15 (Adams) A probability assignment p for the language L is said
to be proper for a conditional assertion α ∼ β iff p(α) > 0. It is proper for a
set of conditional assertions iff it is proper for each element. If p is proper for
A
def
= α ∼ β, we shall use p(A) to denote the conditional probability p(β | α).
Definition 16 (Adams) Let K be a set of conditional assertions. We shall
say that K is probabilistically consistent if and only if for any real number
ǫ > 0 there exists a probability assignment p for L that is proper for K and such
that, for all A in K, one has p(A) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Definition 17 Let K be a set of conditional assertions and A a conditional
assertion. We shall say that K probabilistically entails A iff for all ǫ > 0 there
exists δ > 0 such that for all probability assignments p for L which are proper
for K and A, if p(B) ≥ 1− δ for all B in K, then p(A) ≥ 1− ǫ.
In [1], Adams studies extensively the relations between the two notions of prob-
abilistic consistency and probabilistic entailment, at least for finite sets of condi-
tional assertions. Here we shall only show the fundamental relation that exists
between Adams’ notions and ours. First, we shall make three easy remarks.
The first one concerns only probabilistic notions and was claimed by Adams for
finite knowledge bases but is true in general.
Lemma 19 A set K of conditional assertions is probabilistically inconsistent
iff it probabilistically entails any conditional assertion.
Our second remark provides a first link between probabilistic notions and the
notions introduced in this paper. It is essentially the soundness part of Adams’
soundness and completeness result (see beginning of proof of 4.2 at page 62
of [1]). This is the easy direction.
Lemma 20 Any conditional assertion preferentially entailed by K is probabilis-
tically entailed by K.
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Our third remark is the following.
Lemma 21 If the conditional assertion α ∼ β is in K and α ∼ false is pref-
erentially entailed by K then K is probabilistically inconsistent.
Proof: Under the assumptions of the lemma, Lemma 20 shows that α ∼ false
is probabilistically entailed by K. But for any probability assignment p that
is proper for α ∼ β, p(α ∼ false) is defined and equal to 0. Since K proba-
bilistically entails α ∼ false we conclude that there is an ǫ > 0 such that no
probability assignment that is proper forK and α ∼ β gives probabilities larger
than 1−ǫ to all assertions of K. Since any probability assignment that is proper
for K is also proper for α ∼ β the conclusion is proved.
We shall now prove the converse of Lemma 20 in the case K is finite and
probabilistically consistent. The basic remark is the following. Suppose W is a
finite (i.e., the set S of states is finite) ranked model. Let ǫ > 0 be some real
number. We shall describe a probability measure pǫ on S. The first principle
that will be used in defining pǫ is that all states of the same rank will have equal
probabilities. The second principle is that the weight of the set of all states of
rank n, wn will be such that
wn+1
wn
= ǫ. The intuitive meaning of this choice
(since ǫ will approach zero) is that normal states are more probable than excep-
tional states. There is clearly exactly one probability measure satisfying both
principles above, for any given finite ranked model. The probability measure pǫ,
defined on states, yields a probability measure on formulas. It is clear that a for-
mula α has probability zero under pǫ iff α is inconsistent inW , i.e., α ∼W false.
Suppose α is consistent. Let us consider the conditional probability of β given
α, which is well defined. If α ∼W β then this conditional probability is larger
than 1− ǫ− ǫ2 − ǫ3 − . . . and therefore approaches one when ǫ approaches zero.
On the other hand, if α 6∼W β, then this conditional probability cannot exceed
1 − 1
m
where m is the number of states at the rank which is minimal for α. It
is therefore bounded away from 1 when ǫ approaches 0.
Lemma 22 Let a finite probabilistically consistent knowledge base K be given
and suppose A
def
= α ∼ β is not preferentially entailed by K. Then, K does not
probabilistically entail A.
Proof: Let K and A be as described in the lemma. Let L′ be some logically
finite sublanguage of L that contains α, β and all propositions appearing in K.
Relative to L′, the hypotheses of the lemma are still true. By Lemmas 18 and
Theorem 3, there is a rational relation E that contains K and α ∼ ¬β and for
which a formula is inconsistent only if it is inconsistent for Kp. By Theorem 5,
there is a finite ranked model, W that satisfies α ∼ ¬β and all assertions of
K but whose inconsistent formulas are exactly those of Kp. Since α is not
inconsistent for Kp, the model W does not satisfy α∼ β. Let W ′ be the model
obtained by extending the labeling function of W to the full language L in an
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arbitrary way. We shall now apply the construction of pǫ described above on
the model W ′.
Using the model W ′ and a sequence of ǫ’s approaching zero, we define a
sequence of probability measures pǫ. Let us show that all assignments pǫ are
proper for K and A. If γ ∈ L′, the assignment pǫ gives zero probability to γ
iff γ is inconsistent in W , i.e., inconsistent for Kp. But K is probabilistically
consistent and, by Lemma 21, pǫ is proper for K. Since W
′ does not satisfy A,
its antecedent cannot be inconsistent in W ′ and pǫ is proper for A too. When
ǫ approaches zero, the conditional probabilities corresponding to each assertion
of K approach 1 and the conditional probability corresponding to A is bounded
away from 1.
That the result cannot be extended to infinite sets of conditional assertions
follows from Adams’ remark that his notion of probabilistic consistency does
not enjoy the compactness property and from Corollary 1. Adams’ example [1,
pages 51–52] is closely related to the construction of Lemma 1. The results of
Adams presented in this section have been interpreted, in particular by [26], to
mean that probabilistic semantics validate preferential reasoning. We certainly
agree. But the results that will be presented now show, in our opinion, that
probabilistic semantics support the claim that inference procedures should not
only be preferential but also rational. Indeed we show, in Appendix B, that some
very natural probabilistic models always define rational relations and that, when
the language L is countable, all rational relations may be defined by such models.
Those models are non-standard probability spaces, in the sense of A. Robinson.
Since no use of those models will be made in the paper, their treatment has
been relegated to an appendix.
5 The rational closure of a conditional knowl-
edge base
5.1 Introduction
So far, we have argued for Thesis 1 and gathered much knowledge about rational
relations, showing in particular that there is no obvious way to define a notion of
closure satisfying Thesis 1. In this section we shall show that there is a natural
notion of closure (called rational closure) that satisfies Thesis 1. We shall study
it and prove that it possesses many very elegant mathematical properties. We
shall, then, evaluate the value of rational closure as an answer to the question
of the title. In conclusion, we shall propose Thesis 2, that claims that any
satisfactory answer is a superset of rational closure. In other terms we think that
any reasonable system should endorse any assertion contained in the rational
closure, but it may also endorse some additional assertions. At present, we do
not know of any natural construction satisfying Thesis 1 other than rational
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closure.
A first possible answer is rejected in 5.2. This result appeared in [18]. The
remainder of the paper describes rational closure. In 5.3 a partial ordering
between rational relations is defined, which captures the notion of a relation
being preferable to (i.e., smaller, less adventurous, more reasonable than) an-
other one. The rational closure of a knowledge base is then defined in 5.4 as the
rational extension of a knowledge base that is preferable in the ordering defined
in Section 5.3 to all other rational extensions. Not every knowledge base has
a rational closure, but in Section 5.6 it will be shown that any admissible (see
Definition 11) knowledge base has a rational closure. By Lemma 7, then, any
finite knowledge base has a rational closure. We claim that the rational closure
of a knowledge base, when it exists, provides a reasonable answer to the question
of the title. Global properties of the operation of rational closure are described
in 5.5. These results, concerning the global behavior of a nonmonotonic infer-
ence operation, are the first of their kind. In 5.6 an algorithmic construction
of the rational closure of an admissible knowledge base is described. This algo-
rithmic description essentially replaces and improves upon the proof-theoretic
description of [18]. A corrected and generalized model-theoretic construction,
first described in [18] is proposed in 5.7. Section 5.8 presents an algorithm to
compute the rational closure of a finite knowledge base and discusses complexity
issues. Section 5.9 discusses the appeal of rational closure and provides some
examples. Section 6 concludes by considering topics for further research. In [27]
J. Pearl proposes his own version of the rational closure construction that had
been described in [18].
5.2 Perfect extensions
All that has been done so far does not allow us to give a satisfactory answer to
the question of the title. Let K be a set of conditional assertions. We would like
to define a consequence relation K, the rational closure of K, that contains all
the conditional assertions that we intuitively expect to follow from K. At this
point the reader should be convinced that K should be a rational consequence
relation that extends K. Any such relation obviously also extends Kp. It seems
that we would also like this rational extension of K to be as small as possible.
Unfortunately Theorem 6 shows that the intersection of all rational extensions
of K is exactly Kp and therefore not in general rational and highly unsuitable
as shown in Section 3.5. There is obviously a maximal such extension: the full
consequence relation, (i.e., α ∼ β for all α, β in L) but this is certainly not the
one we are looking for. Can we find out a number of properties that we would
like K to possess, in order to, at least, narrow the field of possibilities? We shall
look both for local properties of K with respect to K and for global properties
of the mapping K 7→ K. The sequel will present a proposal for the definition of
K and proofs that it enjoys both local and global (in particular a strong form
of cumulativity) properties.
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IfKp happens to be rational, then we probably have no reason to look further
and should take K to be equal to Kp. If Kp is not rational, then there is an
assertion α∼ β in Kp, and a formula γ such that neither α ∧ γ ∼ β nor α∼ ¬γ
are inKp. It seems that the right thing to do, in most such cases, is to introduce
α ∧ γ ∼ β in K. One may try to require that any assertion in K−Kp be of
the form α ∧ γ ∼ β where α∼ β is in Kp, i.e., that any assertion in K−Kp
have support in Kp. It will be shown that this may well be impossible. Let us
encapsulate this idea in definitions.
Definition 18 An assertion α ∼ β is said to be supported by (or in) Kp iff
there is a formula γ such that α |= γ and γ ∼ β is in Kp.
Definition 19 A rational extension K′ of K is called perfect iff every assertion
of K′ is supported by Kp.
We may present the following disappointing result.
Lemma 23 There is a finite conditional knowledge base that has no rational
perfect extension.
Proof: Let L be the set of all propositional formulas built out of the set of four
propositional variables: {a, b, c, d}. Let W be the preferential model with three
states: {s, t, u}, in which s ≺ t (and this is the only pair in the relation ≺) and s
satisfies only a, t satisfies only b and u satisfies only c and d. Let K be the set of
all conditional assertions satisfied inW . We claim thatK has no rational perfect
extension. Notice, first, that W satisfies a ∨ b ∼ ¬b. This assertion is therefore
in K. Any ranked model satisfying a ∨ b ∼ ¬b must satisfy at least one of the
following two assertions: a ∨ c ∼ ¬c or b ∨ c ∼ ¬b. Any rational extension of
K must therefore contain one of the two assertions above. But a ∨ c ∼ ¬c has
clearly no support in Kp and therefore any perfect rational extension of K must
contain: b ∨ c ∼ ¬b. But W satisfies c ∼ d and any ranked model satisfying
both b ∨ c ∼ ¬b and c ∼ d must also satisfy b ∨ c ∼ d. Any perfect rational
extension of K must therefore contain this last formula but it clearly lacks
support in Kp. We conclude that K has no perfect rational extension.
It is therefore reasonable to look for less than perfect extensions. Let us first
examine perfection concerning two special kinds of formulas. The following is
easily proved.
Lemma 24 An assertion of the form α ∼ false is supported by Kp iff it is in
Kp. An assertion of the form true ∼ α is supported by Kp iff it is in Kp.
We shall propose a construction of K such that K does not contain any formula
of the form α ∼ false or of the form true ∼ α that is not in Kp.
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5.3 Ordering rational relations
In this section we shall define a strict partial ordering between rational relations.
This ordering captures the notion of a relation being preferable to, i.e., less ad-
venturous than another one. An intuitive explanation will be given immediately
after the definition. For the rest of this section we shall write α < β for ( or in)
K to mean the assertion α ∨ β ∼ ¬β is in K. We shall write α ≤ β for ( or in)
K when it is not the case that β<α in K.
Definition 20 Let K0 and K1 be two rational consequence relations. We shall
say that K0 is preferable to K1 and write K0 ≺ K1 iff:
1. there exists an assertion α∼ β in K1 −K0 such that for all γ such that
γ < α for K0, and for all δ such that γ∼ δ is in K0, we also have γ∼ δ
in K1, and
2. for any γ, δ if γ∼ δ is in K0 −K1 there is an assertion ρ ∼ η in K1 −K0
such that ρ < γ for K1.
The intuitive explanation behind Definition 20 is the following. Suppose two
agents, who agree on a common knowledge base, are discussing the respective
merits of two rational relations K0 and K1. A typical attack would be: your
relation contains an assertion, α∼ β, that mine does not contain (and therefore
contains unsupported assertions). A possible defense against such an attack
could be: yes, but your relation contains an assertion γ∼ δ that mine does not,
and you yourself think that γ refers to a situation that is more usual than the
one refered to by α. Such a defense must be accepted as valid. Definition 20
exactly says that the proponent of K0 has an attack that the proponent of K1
cannot defend against (this is part 1) but that he (i.e., the proponent of K0)
may find a defense against any attack from the proponent of K1 (this is part 2
of the definition).
Lemma 25 The relation ≺ between rational consequence relations is irreflexive
and transitive.
Proof: Irreflexivity follows immediately from Condition 1. For transitivity, let
us suppose that K0 ≺ K1, with α∼ β the witness promised by Condition 1 and
that K1 ≺ K2 with γ ∼ δ as a witness. Our first step will be to show that there
exists an assertion ε∼ ζ in K2 − K0 such that ε ≤ α in K0 and ε ≤ γ in K1.
We shall have to consider many different cases.
1. Suppose γ < α in K2.
(a) If γ < α is not in K0, then γ < α is a suitable ε∼ ζ.
(b) If γ < α is in K0, then γ∼ δ is a suitable ε∼ ζ, since if it were in
K0 it would be in K1.
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2. Suppose therefore that γ < α is not in K2, i.e., for K2, α ≤ γ.
(a) If γ < α is in K1, then it is in K1 − K2 and there is an assertion
ξ ∼ η in K2 −K1 such that ξ < γ ∨ α in K2.
i. If ξ < γ ∨ α is not in K0, then it is a suitable ε∼ ζ.
ii. If ξ < γ ∨ α is in K0, then ξ < α in K0 and we have both that
ξ < γ ∨ α in K1 and that ξ ∼ η cannot be in K0, otherwise it
would be in K1. We conclude that ξ ∼ η is a suitable ε∼ ζ.
(b) Suppose therefore that γ < α is not in K1, i.e., for K1, like for K2,
α ≤ γ.
i. If α∼ β is in K2, then it is a suitable ε∼ ζ.
ii. If α∼ β is not in K2, then it is in K1−K2 and there is a ξ ∼ η
in K2 −K1 such that ξ < α in K2.
A. If ξ < α is not in K0, then it is a suitable ε∼ ζ since, in K1,
ξ ∨ α ≤ α ≤ γ.
B. If ξ < α is in K0 then ξ ∼ η is a suitable ε∼ ζ since ξ ∼ η
cannot be in K0, otherwise it would be in K1.
We have now proved the existence of an assertion ε∼ ζ with the desired
properties. Let us proceed to the proof that K0 ≺ K2. For property 1, we claim
that ε∼ ζ provides a suitable witness. It is indeed in K2−K0 by construction.
Suppose now that ξ < ε in K0. Then ξ < α in K0 and therefore ξ < ε in K1.
Therefore ξ < γ in K1. If ξ ∼ η is in K0, then it must be in K1 since ξ < α
in K0 and also in K2 since ξ < γ in K1. This concludes the verification of
Condition 1.
For Condition 2, suppose that ϕ ∼ θ is in K0−K2. We have to find a ξ ∼ η
in K2−K0 such that ξ < ϕ in K2. We shall consider a number of different cases.
1. If ε < ϕ in K2, then ε∼ ζ is a suitable ξ ∼ η.
2. Suppose then that ε < ϕ is not in K2, i.e., ϕ ≤ ε for K2.
(a) Suppose, first that ε < ϕ is in K1, therefore in K1 − K2. There is
then an assertion ρ ∼ τ in K2 −K1 such that ρ < ε ∨ ϕ in K2.
i. If ρ < ε ∨ ϕ is in K0, then ρ < α in K0 and we conclude that
ρ ∼ τ is not in K0, otherwise it would be in K1. We conclude
that ρ ∼ τ is a suitable ξ ∼ η.
ii. If ρ < ε ∨ ϕ is not in K0, then it is a suitable ξ ∼ η.
(b) Suppose, then, that ε < ϕ is not in K1, i.e., for K1, ϕ ≤ ε.
i. If ε < ϕ is in K0, then it is in K0 − K1. Therefore there is an
assertion ρ ∼ τ in K1−K0 such that ρ < ε ∨ ϕ in K1. But then
ρ < γ in K1 and we conclude that ρ ∼ τ is in K2 and that ρ < ϕ
in K2. The assertion ρ ∼ τ is a suitable ξ ∼ η.
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ii. Suppose, then that, on the contrary, ε < ϕ is not in K0, i.e.,
ϕ ≤ ε in K0, as in K1 and K2.
A. Suppose first that ϕ ∼ θ is in K1, therefore in K1 − K2.
Then, there is an assertion ρ ∼ τ in K2 − K1, such that
ρ < ϕ in K2. There are two cases. If ρ < ϕ is in K0, then
ρ < ε in K0, and ρ ∼ τ is not in K0, otherwise it would be in
K1, since ρ < ε ≤ α in K0. The assertion ρ ∼ τ is a suitable
ξ ∼ η. If, on the other hand ρ < ϕ is not in K0, then it is
in K2 −K0, and it is a suitable ξ ∼ η.
B. Suppose now that ϕ ∼ θ is not in K1, therefore in K0 −K1.
There is an assertion ρ ∼ τ in K1 −K0, such that ρ < ϕ in
K1. But ρ < ϕ ≤ ε ≤ γ in K1 and since ρ ∼ τ is in K1 it
must be in K2. Also, since ρ < ϕ is in K1, it must be in K2.
We see that ρ ∼ τ is a suitable ξ ∼ η.
5.4 Definition of rational closure
We may now define the rational closure of a knowledge base.
Definition 21 Let K be an arbitrary knowledge base. If there is a rational
extension K of K that is preferable to all other rational extensions of K, then
K will be called the rational closure of K.
Notice first that the rational closure of a knowledge base is unique, if it exists,
since preference is a partial ordering. Notice then that there are knowledge bases
that do not have a rational closure. Example 1 will show this. In Section 5.6
we shall show that admissible knowledge bases, including all finite knowledge
bases, have a rational closure.
Example 1 Let L be the propositional calculus built upon the variables pn
where n is an arbitrary integer (i.e., positive or negative). Let N be the knowl-
edge base that contains all assertions of the form pn ∼ pn+2 and of the form
pn ∼ ¬pn−2 for all integers n. We shall show that N has no rational closure.
We shall first prove a lemma about invariance of the operation of rational
closure under renaming of the proposional variables. This lemma is of indepen-
dent interest.
Definition 22 1. A renaming of the propositional calculus L is a bijection
of the propositional variables.
2. Let f be a renaming of L. The formula obtained from α by substituting
f(p) for the propositional variable p will be denoted by f(α).
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3. Let f be as above and α∼ β a conditional assertion. The assertion f(α) ∼
f(β) will be denoted by f(α ∼ β).
4. Let f be as above and K a consequence relation. The relation f(K) will
be defined by f(K) = {f(α∼ β) | α∼ β ∈ K}.
Lemma 26 (Invariance under renaming) Let f be a renaming of L.
1. Let K0 and K1 be rational consequence relations. Then K0 ≺ K1 iff
f(K0) ≺ f(K1).
2. Let K be a consequence relation and K its rational closure ,then f(K) is
the rational closure of f(K)
3. LetK be a consequence relation which is invariant under f , namely f(K) =
K,then its rational closure (if it exists) is invariant under f .
Proof: The proof is immediate from the definitions, noting that f is also a
bijection of the set of all consequence relations.
Lemma 27 The knowledge base N defined above has no rational closure.
Proof: We shall reason by contradiction. Suppose R is the rational closure of
N . From Lemma 30 in the sequel (the proof of which does not depend on the
present lemma), we know that there is no assertion of the form α∼ false in
R that is not in Np. Using a construction very similar to the one used in the
proof of Lemma 1, one may build, for any integer n, a preferential model of N ,
containing a top state that satisfies pn. Therefore, for any n, pn is consistent
for R.
Remember that a < b is the assertion a ∨ b ∼ ¬b. We shall write a < b to
mean that a ∨ b ∼ ¬b is in R. If follows from results of Section 3.6 that, on
formulas that are consistent for R, the relation < is a strict modular ordering.
Notice, also, that, for any n, the assertion pn+2 < pn belongs to N
p, since both
pn ∼ pn+2 and pn+2 ∼ ¬pn are in Np. Therefore pn+2 < pn. There are, in R,
two infinite (in both directions) chains (for <), one containing the variables of
odd index, the other one containing those of even index. Since < is modular,
we may consider only four cases:
1. For every even n and odd k, pn > pk. Let f be the renaming of L given by
f(m) = m+ 1. Clearly f(N) = N . Hence, by Lemma 26 we must have
f(R) = R. But this last statement implies pn > pk for even n and odd k,
and therefore implies that all pn’s are inconsistent for R. A contradiction.
2. For every even n and odd k, pn < pk. The argument is exactly as in case 1,
systematically interchanging ‘odd’ and ‘even’.
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3. There is an odd k ,and there are evenm and n such that pn < pk < pm. In
this case, define a renaming f by f(l) = l for odd l and f(l) = l+m−n for
even l. The contradiction is as above by noting that f transforms pn < pk
into pm < pk.
4. None of the above is true. In such a case one may see that there must
exist an even m ,and odd i and j such that pi < pm < pj . The argument
is exactly as in case 3, systematically interchanging ‘odd’ and ‘even’.
5.5 Global properties of the operation of rational closure
First, we show that rational closure possesses a loop property analogous to the
property discussed in [17, Section 4]. This is a powerful property that one is
happy to have.
Lemma 28 (Loop property) Let Ki for i = 0, . . . , n− 1 be knowledge bases
such that, for any i, Ki+1 ⊆ Ki, where addition is understood modulo n. Then
for any i, j, one has Ki = Kj.
Proof: LetK  K ′ mean that eitherK ≺ K ′ orK = K ′. Since Ki is a rational
extension of Ki+1, we have Ki+1  Ki, for all i’s (modulo n). We conclude that
the rational closures of all the Ki’s are equal.
The following property of reciprocity is the special case n = 2.
Corollary 4 If X ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X, then X = Y .
The following property of cumulativity is equivalent to reciprocity in the presence
of inclusion (i.e., K ⊆ K).
Corollary 5 If X ⊆ Y ⊆ X then X = Y .
The meaning of Corollary 5 is that one may add to a knowledge base anything
that is in its rational closure without changing this closure. We may now show
that, in two different respects, rational closure is close to being perfect.
Lemma 29 The consequence relation K, if it exists, contains an assertion of
the form true ∼ α only if this assertion is in Kp.
Proof: Suppose an assertion of the form above is in K. We shall show that it
must be in any rational extension ofK and will conclude by Theorem 6. Suppose
K ′ is a rational extension of K and true ∼ α is in K−K ′. Since K≺ K ′, we
know there is an assertion γ ∼ δ in K ′ −K such that γ < true in K ′. But this
means true ∼ false is in K ′, and contradicts the fact that true ∼ α is not in
K ′.
Lemma 30 The consequence relation K, if it exists, contains an assertion of
the form α∼ false only if this assertion is in Kp.
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Proof: Let V and T be preferential models defining the relations K and Kp
respectively. Such models exist by Theorem 1. Let U be the model obtained
by putting T on top of V , i.e., every state of V is less than every state of
T . One easily sees that U satisfies the smoothness property and is therefore a
preferential model. It defines a preferential relation S. An assertion of the form
α∼ false is in S only if it is in Kp, since T is a submodel of U . If α is not
inconsistent in K then for any β, α∼ β is in S iff it is in K. By Lemma 18,
there is a rational extension R of S with the same set of inconsistent formulas. If
one looks at the construction described in the proof of this lemma, one sees that
it will add to S only assertions with antecedent inconsistent in K. Therefore,
if α is not inconsistent in K, for any β, α∼ β is in R iff it is in K. Now, R
is a rational extension of K. If R is equal to K, we are through. Suppose not.
Then we have K ≺ R. Suppose now that α∼ false is in K−R. There must be
an assertion γ∼ δ in R−K such that γ < α in R. But γ ∼ δ in R−K implies
that γ∼ false is in K and γ∼ δ is in K. A contradiction.
5.6 Admissible knowledge bases and their rational closure
In this section, we show that an admissible (see Definition 11) knowledge base
has a rational closure and that this rational closure may be defined in terms of
the ranks of the formulas, as defined in Section 2.6. This provides a useful and
elegant characterization of the rational closure of an admissible knowledge base.
Theorem 7 Let K be an admissible conditional knowledge base. The rational
closure K of K exists and is the set S of all assertions α∼ β such that either
1. the rank of α is strictly less than the rank of α ∧ ¬β (this includes the case
α has a rank and α ∧ ¬β has none), or
2. α has no rank (In this case α ∧ ¬β has no rank either).
Proof: Suppose indeed that every formula consistent with Kp has a rank. We
have many things to check. First let us prove that S contains K. If α∼ β is
in K and α has rank τ , then Cτ contains α∼ β and entails true ∼ α→ β.
Therefore α ∧ ¬β is exceptional for Cτ , and has rank strictly larger than τ .
We should now check that S is rational. For Left Logical Equivalence,
Right Weakening and Reflexivity the proof is easy. For Cautious Mono-
tonicity, notice that if α∼ β is in S, then α and α ∧ β have the same rank. For
And and Or, notice that the rank of a disjunction is the smaller of the ranks
of its components. For Rational Monotonicity, notice that if α ∼ ¬β is not
in S, then α and α ∧ β have the same rank.
We must now check that if R is a rational extension of K that is different
from S then S ≺ R. Let R be such an extension. We shall first show that S
and R must agree on all assertions whose antecedents have no rank (the notion
of rank is always defined by reference to K). Indeed, by construction, any such
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assertion is in S, and it is preferentially entailed by K since K is admissible. It
is therefore in R. We conclude that S and R must differ for some assertion that
has rank. Let τ be the smallest rank at which S and R differ, i.e., the smallest
rank of an α such that there is a β such that α ∼ β ∈ (S −R) ∪ (R − S). We
have two cases to consider, either there is a formula α of rank greater or equal
to τ such that, for all formulas β of rank greater or equal to τ , α ≤ β in R, or
there is no such formula.
Suppose there is such an α. Our first claim is that, for any β of rank greater
than τ , the assertion α < β is in R. Consider indeed a ranked model W that
defines R. LetW ′′ be the supermodel obtained fromW by adding toW , at each
level l a state labeled with world w for all worlds w that label a state of rank
less than l in W . It is clear that W ′′ is ranked and defines the same relation
as W , and, in W ′′, every label that appears at some level l also appears at all
greater levels. Let W ′ be the submodel of W ′′ that contains all those states of
level (rank in W ′′) greater or equal to the minimal level l at which some state
satisfies α. It clearly satisfies the smoothness property (for this we needed to
go through the construction of W ′′). Since a formula is satisfied in W ′′ at some
level less than l iff it is of rank less than τ , no antecedent of an assertion of
Cτ is satisfied at any level less than l. But W
′′ is a model of K and therefore
W ′ is a model of Cτ . But Cτ preferentially entails true ∼ ¬β. The model
W ′ therefore satisfies true ∼ ¬β but not true ∼ ¬α. It therefore also satisfies
α < β. But the antecedent of this last assertion has rank greater or equal to τ ,
and therefore no state of W ′′ that is not in W ′ satisfies it. Therefore α < β is
satisfied by W ′′ and is an element of R. satisfies Our second claim is that there
is an assertion γ ∼ δ in R− S, such that γ is of rank τ and γ ≤ α in R. We
consider two cases.
1. There is an assertion ξ ∼ η in S −R with ξ of rank τ . Then ξ ∧ ¬η has
rank greater than τ , and by our first claim, α < ξ ∧ ¬η is in R. But ξ ∼ η
is not in R, and therefore we must have α < ξ for R. This last assertion is
not in S since both α and ξ have rank τ . The assertion α < ξ is a suitable
γ∼ δ.
2. There is an assertion ξ ∼ η in R− S with ξ of rank τ . If ξ ≤ α in R, then
ξ ∼ η is a suitable γ ∼ δ. Suppose, then, that α < ξ in R. Since ξ has
the same rank as α, α < ξ is in R− S and a suitable γ ∼ δ.
We may now conclude that S ≺ R. The assertion γ∼ δ fulfills the require-
ments of Condition 1 of Definition 20, since γ has rank τ . For Condition 2,
suppose ξ ∼ η is in S −R, then ξ must be of rank greater or equal to τ and
ξ ∧ ¬η is of rank greater than τ . By our first remark we conclude that α < ξ ∧ ¬η
for R. It is a matter of elementary properties of rational relations to check that
if α < ξ ∧ ¬η is in R, but ξ ∼ η is not, then α < ξ for R. Since γ ≤ α in R, we
conclude that γ < ξ for R.
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Suppose now that there is no such α. Take any formula γ of rank τ . There
is a formula δ of rank greater or equal to τ such that δ < γ for R. But this
assertion is then in R− S. It satisfies Condition 1 of Definition 20, since its
antecedent has rank τ . Suppose now ϕ ∼ θ is in S −R. Then ϕ is of rank at
least τ . If it is of rank τ , there is a formula π of rank at least τ such that π < ϕ
is in R, but not in S and this provides the witness requested by Condition 2. If
it is of rank greater than τ , then the assertion δ < γ defined just above will do.
5.7 A model-theoretic description of rational closure
We shall describe here a model-theoretic construction that transforms a pref-
erential model W into a ranked model W ′ by letting all states of W sink as
low as they can respecting the order of W , i.e., ranks the states of W by their
height in W . We shall show that, under certain conditions, the model W ′ de-
fines the rational closure of the relation defined by W . This construction is
clearly interesting only when the model W is well-founded. We know that, in
this case, the relation defined by W indeed possesses a rational closure (The-
orem 7 and Lemma 7). It would have been pleasant to be able to prove the
validity of such a construction on an arbitrary well-founded preferential model.
Unfortunately we are not able to show this in general, but need to suppose, in
addition, that the preferential relation defined by W is well-founded (see Def-
inition 8). This is quite a severe restriction, since we have seen at the end of
Section 2.3 that finitely-generated relations on arbitrary languages L are not
always well-founded. When the language L is logically finite, we know all pref-
erential relations are well-founded. Given a well-founded preferential relation,
the construction may be applied to any of its well-founded models.
Let P be a well-founded preferential relation and W = 〈S, l,≺〉 any well-
founded preferential model that defines P . We shall define, for any ordinal τ ,
two sets of states: Uτ and Vτ . Those sets satisfy, for any τ , Uτ ⊆ Vτ ⊆ Uτ+1.
The set Uτ contains, in addition to the elements of previous V ’s, the states that
are minimal among those states not previously added. The set Vτ contains, in
addition to the states of Uτ , all states that satisfy only formulas already satisfied
by states previously considered.
Uτ
def
=
⋃
ρ<τ
Vρ
∪ {s ∈ S | ∀t ∈ S such that t ≺ s, there is a ρ < τ such that t ∈ Vρ} (19)
Vτ
def
= {s ∈ S | ∀α ∈ L such that s≡ α, ∃t ∈ Uτ such that t≡ α} (20)
Since the model W is well-founded, every state s ∈ S is in some Vτ . Let the
height of a state s ∈ S (in W ) be the least ordinal τ for which s ∈ Vτ . We shall
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now show that there is a close relationship between the rank of a formula α
in P (see definition following Definition 10) and the height in W of the states
that satisfy α. For any ordinal τ , we shall denote by Wτ the substructure of
W consisting of all states of height larger or equal to τ . Notice that, since W
is well-founded, Wτ is a preferential model. Notice also that all elements of
Uτ −
⋃
ρ<τ Vρ are minimal elements of Wτ .
Lemma 31 Let τ be an ordinal. Let α be a formula of rank at least τ and β be
any formula.
1. No state of height less than τ satisfies α.
2. The model Wτ satisfies α∼ β iff α∼ β is preferentially entailed by Cτ .
In particular, if α has no rank, no state in S satisfies α.
Proof: It proceeds by simultaneous ordinal induction on τ . Suppose both
claims have been proved for all ordinals ρ < τ . Let us prove our first claim. Since
α has rank at least τ , for any ρ, ρ < τ , Cρ preferentially entails true ∼ ¬α. By
the induction hypothesis (item 2), Wρ satisfies true ∼ ¬α. Therefore no state
of Uρ −
⋃
σ<ρ Vσ satisfies α. If there were a state s of height ρ < τ satisfying
α, there would be a state t of Uρ −
⋃
σ<ρ Vσ satisfying α. We conclude that no
state of height less than τ satisfies α.
For the second claim, by Lemma 5, α∼ β is preferentially entailed by C0
(i.e., in P , i.e., satisfied by W ) iff it is preferentially entailed by Cτ . By the first
claim, α∼ β is satisfied by W iff it is satisfied by Wτ .
Lemma 32 A formula α has rank τ in P iff there is a state s ∈ S of height τ
that satisfies α and there is no such state of height less than τ .
Proof: We shall prove the only if part. The if part is then obvious. First,
remark that if ∼ is a preferential relation that contains the assertion α∨β∼ ¬α
, then it contains the assertion true ∼ ¬α. This is easily shown by preferential
reasoning. Suppose now that α has rank τ . Lemma 31 shows that no state of
height less than τ satisfies α. We must show that there is a state of height τ
satisfying α. Let β be any formula of rank larger or equal to τ that is minimal
with respect to < among those formulas. There is such a formula since the set is
not empty (α is there) and < is well-founded. Since α is not exceptional for Cτ ,
the assertion true ∼ ¬α is not preferentially entailed by Cτ and therefore the
assertion α∨β ∼ ¬α is not preferentially entailed by Cτ . But α∨β has rank τ
and, by Lemma 31,Wτ does not satisfy α∨β ∼ ¬α. There is, therefore, in Wτ a
state s satisfying α such that no state t in Wτ , t ≺ s, satisfies β. We shall show
that s is minimal in Wτ and has therefore height τ . Suppose s is not minimal in
Wτ . There would be a state t minimal in Wτ such that t ≺ s. This state t has
height τ and, by construction, it satisfies some formula β′ that is not satisfied
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at any smaller height. By Lemma 31, β′ has rank larger or equal to τ , and the
formula β ∨ β′ has rank larger or equal to τ . Since β ∨ β′ ≤ β, the minimality
of β implies that β ≤ β ∨ β′. In other terms, β ∨ β′∼ β. But the state t, in W ,
satisfies β′ and is minimal among states satisfying β ∨ β′. Therefore t satisfies
β. A contradiction.
Lemma 32 shows that, given a well-founded preferential relation (resp. a
finite knowledge base), and a well-founded preferential modelW for it (resp. for
its preferential closure), one may build a ranked model for its rational closure
by ranking the states of W by their depth.
5.8 Computing rational closure
We shall now provide an algorithm for deciding whether an assertion is in the
rational closure of a finite knowledge base. The notation E(C) has been defined
following Definition 10. Lemma 7 and Theorem 7 show that, given a finite
knowledge base K and an assertion α∼ β the following algorithm is adequate.
C = K;
while α is exceptional for C and E(C) 6= C, C := E(C);
if α ∧ ¬β is exceptional for C then answer yes else answer no.
The only thing left for us to implement is checking whether a formula is
exceptional for a given finite knowledge base. The next lemma shows this is
easily done.
Definition 23 Let A be the conditional assertion α∼ β. The material coun-
terpart of A, denoted by A˜, is the formula α→ β, where →, as usual, denotes
material implication. If K is a set of assertions, its material counterpart K˜ is
the set of material counterparts of K.
Lemma 33 Let K be a conditional knowledge base and α a formula. Then
K˜ |= α iff K preferentially entails true ∼ α.
Proof: The if part follows from the fact that any world satisfying K˜ and
not α provides a one state preferential model satisfying K and not satisfying
true ∼ α. For the only if part suppose K˜ |= α. By compactness, there is a
finite subset of K˜ that entails α. By rules S, And and Right Weakening we
conclude that K preferentially entails true ∼ α.
Corollary 6 Let K be a conditional knowledge base and α a formula. The
formula α is exceptional for K iff K˜ |= ¬α.
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We see that, if K contains n assertions, in the previous algorithm, we may go
over the while loop at most O(n) times. Each time we shall have to consider
at most n + 1 formulas and decide whether they are exceptional or not. The
whole algorithm needs at most O(n2) such decisions. In the most general case
all such decisions are instances of the satisfiability problem for propositional
calculus, therefore solvable in non-deterministic polynomial time (in the size
of the knowledge base K times the size of the formulas involved). Therefore,
even in the most general case, the problem is not much more complex than the
satisfiability problem for propositional calculus. These results may be improved
if we restrict ourselves to assertions of a restricted type. For example, if the
assertions of K are of the Horn type (we mean their material counterpart is a
Horn formula), and the assertion α∼ β is of the same type, then, since each de-
cision may be taken in polynomial deterministic time, the whole algorithm runs
in deterministic polynomial time. The complexity discussion above is mainly
of theoretical interest. The important practical question is: given a fixed large
knowledge base, what information, of reasonable size, should be precomputed
to allow efficient answers to queries of the type: is an A in the rational closure?
The pre-computation of the different Cn sub-bases would already reduce the
exponent of n in the complexity of the algorithm by one.
J. Dix noticed that the algorithm just presented for computing the rational
closure of a finite knowledge base may be used to compute the preferential
closure of such a knowledge base, since, by Corollary 3 and Lemmas 7 and 30,
the assertion α∼ β is in Kp iff the assertion α ∼ false is in the rational closure
of the knowledge base K∪{α ∼ ¬β}.
5.9 A discussion of rational closure
We have so far shown that rational closure provides a mathematically elegant
and effective answer to the question of the title that satisfies Thesis 1. It is now
time to evaluate whether it provides an answer that matches our intuitions.
We shall first present two now classical knowledge bases, describe their rational
closure and examine whether they fit our intuitions. Then, we shall discuss the
way rational closure treats inheritance of generic properties to abnormal indi-
viduals. Finally, we shall try to address the question of whether our formalism
is suitable to describe domain knowledge.
Example 2 (Nixon diamond) Let our knowledge base consist of the follow-
ing two assertions.
1. republican ∼ ¬pacifist
2. quaker ∼ pacifist
It is easy to see that none of the assertions of the base is exceptional, but that the
formula republican∧quaker is exceptional. From this we deduce that neither the
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assertion republican∧quaker ∼ pacifist nor the assertion republican∧quaker ∼ ¬pacifist
is in the rational closure. This seems the intuitively correct decision in the
presence of contradictory information. In fact, if we know somebody to be
both a Quaker and a Republican, we (i.e., rational closure) shall draw about
him only conclusions that are logically implied by our information. Rational
closure endorses worker ∧ republican ∼ ¬pacifist, meaning that, since we have
no information on the pacifism of workers, we shall assume that Republican
workers behave as Republicans in this respect. We (i.e., rational closure) also
endorse pacifist ∼ ¬republican, meaning we are ready to use contraposition in
many circumstances. We do not have ¬pacifist ∼ republican, though, and quite
rightly, since Republicans may well be a small minority among non-pacifists.
We have true ∼ ¬ (republican ∧ quaker), meaning we think being both a Re-
publican and a Quaker is exceptional. We endorse republican ∼ ¬quaker and
quaker ∼ ¬republican, that are also intuitively correct conclusions. If we add
to our knowledge base the fact that rich people are typically Republicans, we
shall deduce that rich people are typically not pacifists, meaning we endorse a
restricted form of transitivity. We shall also deduce that Quakers are typically
not rich, which is perhaps more debatable. We shall not conclude anything
about the pacifism of rich Quakers though, since rich Quakers are exceptional.
We shall not conclude anything either concerning rich Quakers that are not
Republicans, which is more debatable. If we want to conclude that rich non-
Republican Quakers are pacifists, we should add this assertion explicitly to the
knowledge base. The addition will not interfere with previously discussed as-
sertions.
Example 3 (Penguin triangle) Let our knowledge base consist of the fol-
lowing three assertions.
1. penguin ∼ bird
2. penguin ∼ ¬fly
3. bird ∼ fly
The first two assertions are exceptional, the last one is not. It follows that we
(i.e., rational closure) endorse the following assertions: fly ∼ ¬penguin (a case of
contraposition), ¬fly ∼ ¬bird (another case of contraposition), ¬fly ∼ ¬penguin
(penguins are exceptional, even among non-flying objects), bird ∼ ¬penguin
(penguins are exceptional birds), ¬bird ∼ ¬penguin (penguins are exceptional
also among non-birds), bird∧penguin ∼ ¬fly (this is an intuitively correct pre-
emption: we prefer specific information to non-specific information), penguin∧black ∼ ¬fly
(black penguins don’t fly either, since they are normal penguins), bird∧green ∼ fly
(green birds are normal birds).
The following assertions are not endorsed: bird ∧ ¬fly ∼ penguin (there
could be non-flying birds other than penguins), bird ∧ ¬fly ∼ ¬penguin (seems
intuitively clear), penguin ∼ fly (obviously).
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A more general reflexion suggests the following. Theorem 7 shows that, in
the rational closure, no information about normal cases may be relevant to
abnormal cases. It is a very intriguing question whether human beings obey
this rule of reasoning or not. A specific example has been discussed by J. Pearl
in a personal communication. It probably goes back to A. Baker. Suppose we
know that most Swedes are blond and tall. If we are going to meet Jon, whom
we know to be short and to come from Sweden, should we necessarily expect
him to be fair? The answer endorsed by rational closure is not necessarily, since
short Swedes are exceptional and we have no specific information about such
cases. We do not know how people generally handle this and, even if we knew,
it is not clear that AI systems should react in exactly the same way: people
are, after all, notoriously bad with statistical information. The answer to the
question how should people behave in this case, if they were smart and had all
the relevant information, depends on the sociobiology of the Swedish population
and is not relevant either. There is very solid ground, though, to claim that, in
the framework described here, in which a knowledge base contains only positive
conditional assertions, the only sensible way to handle this problem is not to
expect anything about the color of Jon’s hair. The reason is that, if we ever find
out that most short Swedes are blond (or dark, for that matter) it will be easy
enough to add this information to our knowledge base. On the contrary, had we
chosen to infer that Jon is expected to be blond, and had we found out that half
of the short Swedes only are fair, we would not have been able to correct our
knowledge base to remove the unwanted inference: adding the fact that most
short Swedes are not blond being obviously incorrect.
Since, by looking at a number of examples, we have gathered some experi-
ence on the behavior of rational closure, we would like to propose the following
strengthening of Thesis 1.
Thesis 2 The set of assertions entailed by any set of assertions K is a rational
superset of K.
Thesis 2 means that a reasonable system should endorse any assertion contained
in the rational closure, but it may also endorse some additional assertions, as
long as it defines a rational relation. The search for natural constructions sat-
isfying Thesis 2, but providing more inheritance than rational closure is open.
The main question that has not been addressed yet is whether conditional
knowledge bases are suitable to describe domain knowledge. Undoubtedly much
work still has to be done before we may answer this question satisfactorily. We
shall only try to express here why we think the answer may well be positive.
Representing common sense knowledge is far from trivial in any one of the exist-
ing formalisms, such as Circumscription or Default Logic. Indeed to represent
any substantive piece of common sense knowledge in one of those formalisms,
one needs to be an expert at the mechanics of the formalism used, and they differ
greatly from one formalism to the next. Deciding on the different abnormality
predicates in Circumscription and the relations between them, or working out
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the default rules in Default Logic so as to ensure the correct precedence of de-
faults needs the hand of an expert. In the formalism proposed here, conditional
knowledge bases, the treatment is much simpler since abnormality predicates do
not appear explicitely and the default information is described in a much poorer
language than Default Logic. We rely on the general algorithm for computing
rational closure (or some other algorithm that will be found suitable) to deal
in a mechanical, uniform and tractable manner with the interactions between
different pieces of default information. The fact that our language of assertions
is much poorer than other formalisms seems to us to be a great asset.
Nevertheless, it is probable that the size of useful conditional knowledge
bases will be very large. Indeed, in our approach, adding new assertions to the
knowledge base may solve almost any problem. Two main topics for further
research may then be delineated. The first one is to find practical ways to avoid
having to look at the whole knowledge base before answering any query. The
set of assertions constituting a knowledge base will have to be structured (off-
line, once and for all) in such a way that irrelevant assertions do not have to
be looked at. The second one is to find lucid and compact descriptions of large
conditional knowledge bases. This will involve looking seriously into the ques-
tion: where does the conditional knowledge come from? Different answers may
be appropriate in different domains: it may well be that conditional knowledge
is derived from causal knowledge in ways that are different from those in which
it is derived from conventions of speech or statistical information.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a mathematically tractable framework for nonmonotonic rea-
soning that can be proved to possess many pragmatically attractive features. Its
computational complexity compares favorably with that of most well-established
systems. In many cases the intuitively correct answer is obtained. In others,
the answer given and the way it was obtained provide an interesting point of
view on the knowledge base. Much more practical experience is needed before
one may assess the pragmatic value of the approach. The task of extending the
results presented here to first-order languages is not an easy one. First steps
towards this goal are described in [20].
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A Lemmas needed to prove Theorem 5
Let us suppose that some rational consequence relation ∼ is given. The notion
of a consistent formula has been presented in Definition 9. Let S denote the set
of all consistent formulas. Let us now recall Definition 10 of [17].
Definition 24 The world m ∈ U is a normal world for α iff ∀β ∈ L such that
α∼ β, m |= β.
The following is an easy corollary of Lemma 8 of [17].
Lemma 34 A formula is consistent iff there is a normal world for it.
We shall now define a pre-order relation on the set S.
Definition 25 Where α, β ∈ S, we shall say that α is not more exceptional
than β and write αRβ iff α ∨ β 6∼ ¬α.
Lemma 35 The relation R is transitive.
Proof: Straightforward from Lemma 17. The fact that the relation R was
restricted to the set S is not used here and R would have been transitive also
on the whole language L.
Lemma 36 Let α, β ∈ S. Either αRβ or βRα (or both). In particular R is
reflexive.
Proof: The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose we have α 6Rβ and β 6Rα.
Then we have α ∨ β ∼ ¬α and α ∨ β ∼ ¬β. By And and Reflexivity we
have α ∨ β ∼ ¬α ∧ ¬β ∧ (α ∨ β), and therefore α ∨ β ∼ false and, by Rule 14,
(α ∨ β) ∧ β ∼ false. Therefore β ∼ false, contradicting β ∈ S. The fact that
R was restricted to S is crucial here.
The following will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 37 If αRβ, any normal world for α that satisfies β is normal for β.
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Proof: Suppose αRβ, m is normal for α and satisfies β. Let γ be such
that β ∼ γ. We must show that m |= γ. Since m is normal for α and sat-
isfies β, it is enough to show that α ∼ β → γ. But, β ∼ γ implies, by Left
Logical Equivalence, (α ∨ β) ∧ β ∼ γ. By the rule S of [17], one then ob-
tains α ∨ β ∼ β → γ. But, by definition of R, α ∨ β 6∼ ¬α and, by Rational
Monotonicity one deduces (α ∨ β) ∧ α ∼ β → γ.
Definition 26 Let α, β ∈ S. We shall say that α is as exceptional as β and
write α ∼ β iff αRβ and βRα.
Since R is reflexive and transitive, the relation ∼ is an equivalence relation. The
equivalence class of a formula α will be denoted by α and E will denote the set
of equivalence classes of formulas of S under ∼. We shall write α ≤ β iff αRβ
and we shall write α < β iff α ≤ β and α 6∼ β. This notation should cause no
confusion with a similar notation used with a different meaning, in the context
of preferential relations, in [17] and in Section 2.4. By Lemmas 35 and 36, the
relation < is a strict total order on the set E.
Lemma 38 Let α, β be consistent formulas. If β < α then β ∼ ¬α.
Proof: The assumption implies that α 6Rβ, i.e., α ∨ β ∼ ¬α. Rule (15) implies
the conclusion.
Lemma 39 Let α, β be consistent formulas. If there is a normal world for α
that satisfies β, then β ≤ α.
Proof: If there is a normal world for α that satisfies β, then we conclude by
Lemma 38 that α 6∼ ¬β.
Let W be the ranked model 〈V, l,≺〉, where V ⊆ U ×S is the set of all pairs
< m,α > such that m is a normal world for α, l(< m,α >) is defined to be m
and ≺ is defined as < m,α >≺< n, β > iff α < β. To show that W is a ranked
model, we must prove that it satisfies the smoothness condition.
Lemma 40 In W , the state < m,α > is minimal in β̂ iff m |= β and β = α
Proof: First notice that < m,α >∈ β̂ iff m |= β. For the only if part, suppose
that < m,α > is minimal in β̂. The world m is normal for α and satisfies β. By
Lemma 39 we conclude that β ≤ α. But, since β is consistent, by Lemma 34
there is a normal world n for β. The pair < n, β > is an element of V that
satisfies β and, by the minimality of < m,α > in β̂, < n, β > 6≺< m,α >, i.e.,
β 6< α, i.e., α ≤ β. We conclude β = α. For the if part, suppose that m is a
normal world for α that satisfies β and that β = α. If n is normal for γ and
< n, γ >≺< m,α > then γ < α and therefore γ < β. By Lemma 38 γ ∼ ¬β
and n, which is normal for γ, cannot satisfy β. The state < m,α > is then
minimal in β̂.
The following is an immediate corollary of Lemma 40.
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Corollary 7 If m is a normal world for α the pair < m,α > is a state of V
and is minimal in α̂.
Proof: Suppose m is normal for α. First, since there is a normal world for α,
α ∈ S and the pair < m,α > is in V . Since m is normal for α it satisfies α.
We may now prove that the model W satisfies the smoothness property and
defines the consequence relation ∼ .
Lemma 41 Let α be a consistent formula. The set α̂ ⊆ V is smooth.
Proof: Suppose < m, β >∈ α̂. Then, m is a normal world for β that satisfies α
and, by Lemma 39, α ≤ β. If α = β, then, by Lemma 40, < m, β > is minimal
in α̂. Otherwise, α < β. In this case, let n be any world normal for α (there
is such a world since α is consistent). The pair < n, α > is minimal in α̂ by
Lemma 40 and < n, α >≺< m, β >.
Lemma 42 If < m,α > is minimal in β̂, then m is normal for β.
Proof: Suppose < m,α > is minimal in β̂. By Lemma 40 α = β. Therefore
αRβ. But m is normal for α and satisfies β, and Lemma 37 implies that m is
normal for β.
B Non-standard probabilistic semantics
B.1 Introduction
We shall describe now, in Definition 33 another family of probabilistic mod-
els, they provide much more direct semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning than
Adams’, at the price of using the language of non-standard (in the sense of
A. Robinson) probability theory. The purpose of this section is to provide ad-
ditional evidence in support of Thesis 1. We shall show that rational relations
are exactly those that may be defined by non-standard probabilistic models. In
other terms, if, given a probability distribution, we decide to accept the asser-
tion α∼ β iff the conditional probability of β given α is very close to one, then
the consequence relation we define is rational. On the other hand, any rational
relation may be defined, in such a way, by some probability distribution. The
results presented in the appendix are not used in the body of the paper. A dif-
ferent representation theorem for rational relations, also based on Theorem 5,
in terms of one-parameter families of standard probabilistic models has been
proved recently by K. Satoh [32]. Results relating the semantics of condition-
als and non-Archimedean probabilities seem to have been obtained by R. Giles
around 1980.
There is a school of thought in Artificial Intelligence, represented in par-
ticular by [3, 2], that denies the validity of the logical approach to modeling
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common-sense reasoning. The alternative suggested is the Bayesian probabilis-
tic approach. Namely, the only way in which we should make sensible inferences
from our knowledge α is by estimating the conditional probability of the required
conclusion β given our knowledge α, and then adopting β if we are satisfied that
this conditional probability is close enough to 1. We believe that this approach
may run into considerable practical difficulties, the choice being between keep-
ing an explicit data base of these many conditional probabilities or estimating
them from a small sample. The chief source of difficulty here is that knowing
the probability of α and β tells you very little about the probability of their
intersection.
But we shall not argue the matter in detail here. The main purpose of this
section is to show that rational knowledge bases may be considered to come
from such a probabilistic model, if we let the cut-off point of how close the
conditional probability of β given α has to be before we are ready to adopt β
as a sensible consequence of α, approach 1 as a limit. Namely, β is a sensible
consequence of α, iff the conditional probability is infinitesimally close to 1. In
order to have an interesting theory, there must be probabilities that are not
standard real numbers, but belong to a richer system of numbers, containing
some infinitesimally small numbers.
We shall show that this approach allows one to keep a probabilistic intuition
while thinking about common-sense reasoning, namely think about α∼ β as
meaning that the conditional probability of β given α is large, and still defines a
well-behaved consequence relation that is not necessarily monotonic. Note that
if one considers a standard probabilistic model and accepts α∼ β as satisfied
by the model iff the conditional probability Pr(α/β) > 1 − ǫ, for some choice
of a positive ǫ one obtains a consequence relation that is not well-behaved. For
instance, one may have α∼ β and α∼ γ satisfied by the model, while α∼ β∧γ
is not satisfied. If, on the other one hand, one chooses ǫ to be 0, one obtains a
well-behaved consequence relation, but this relation is always monotonic, and
the entailment defined is classical entailment (read ∼ as material implication).
J. McCarthy told us he suggested considering non-standard probabilistic models
long ago, but, as far as we know, this suggestion has not been systematically
pursued.
The structure of this section is as follows: first we shall, briefly, survey the
basic notions of non-standard analysis. We shall also introduce non-standard
probability spaces. Then we shall introduce non-standard probabilistic models
for non-monotonic reasoning, define the consequence relation given by such a
model and prove that any consequence relation given by a non-standard proba-
bility model is rational. Lastly we shall show that the axioms are complete for
this interpretation, i.e., any rational consequence relation can be represented
as the consequence relation given by some non-standard probability model, at
least in the case the language L is countable. If L is not countable, an easy
counter-example shows the result does not hold, but we shall not elaborate in
this paper.
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B.2 Non-Standard Analysis
Non-standard analysis was invented by Abraham Robinson in order to give a
rigorous development of analysis in which limiting processes are replaced by
behaviour at the infinitesimally small, e.g., the derivative becomes a quotient
of the change in the function divided by the change in the argument, when the
argument is infinitesimally increased. In this section we shall give a very brief
introduction to the basic ideas. The reader interested in a full treatment can
consult A. Robinson’s [31] or Keisler’s [16] books on the topic. More advanced
topics related to non-standard probability theory are surveyed in [6].
The basic idea of non-standard analysis is to extend the real numbers to a
larger ordered field while preserving many of the basic properties of the reals.
Therefore, we consider a structure of the form
R∗ = 〈R∗,+∗,×∗, <∗, 0, 1〉
such that R∗ is an elementary extension of the standard real numbers, namely
R ⊂ R∗, the operations and the order relation of R∗ extend those of R and for
every first order formula Φ
R∗ |= Φ(x1, . . . , xn) iff R |= Φ(x1, . . . , xn)
for x1, . . . , xn ∈ R. Since we would like to consider not only properties of the
real numbers, but real valued functions, functions from real valued functions
into reals, and so on, we shall consider a richer structure: the superstructure of
the real numbers.
Definition 27 The superstructure of the set X is V∞(X) =
⋃∞
n=0 Vn where Vn
are defined by induction:
• V0 = X
• Vn+1 = P(Vn) ∪ Vn where P(Y ) is the power set of Y.
Note that the superstructure of X contains all the relations on X , all n-valued
functions from X into X , etc. In a non-standard model of the real numbers
we would like to have a non-standard counterpart to any standard member of
the superstructure of the real numbers. Note that the set theoretical relation
∈ makes sense in the superstructure of X . Recall that a formula of the first
order language having only ∈ as a non logical constant is called bounded if is
constructed by the usual connectives and bounded quantifiers, namely (∀x ∈ y)
and (∃x ∈ y) meaning respectively: ∀x if x ∈ y then . . . and ∃x x ∈ y ∧ . . ..
Definition 28 A non-standard model of analysis is an ordered field R∗that is a
proper extension of the ordered field of the reals, together with a map ∗ from the
superstructure of R into the superstructure of R∗, such that for every bounded
formula Φ(x1 . . . xn):
V∞(R) |= Φ(a1 . . . an) iff V∞(R∗) |= Φ(a
∗
1 . . . a
∗
n) (Leibniz Principle)
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and such that for x ∈ R x∗ = x (we assume that ∗ transforms the standard
operations of R into those of R∗).
The Leibniz principle guarantees that the non-standard counterpart of any stan-
dard notion (namely its ∗) preserves many of the properties of the standard
object. In particular it is an object of the same kind: for example if A is a set
of functions from R to R, then A∗ is a set of functions from R∗ into R∗. As
another example consider the absolute value as a function from R to R. In R
it has the property
(∀x ∈ R)(| x |≥ 0 ∧ (| x |= 0↔ x = 0))
Then by the Leibniz principle
(∀x ∈ R∗) (| x |∗≥∗ 0 ∧ (| x |∗= 0↔ x = 0))
In fact since the ∗ versions of the standard arithmetic operations and relations
(like ≤, ≥, >,<) are so similar to the standard ones (they extend them) we shall
simplify the notation by dropping the ∗, letting the context determine whether
we mean the standard operation onR, or its extension to R∗. The next theorem
shows that this is not a formal game:
Theorem 8 (Robinson) There exists a non-standard model for analysis.
The proof is an application of the compactness theorem. The extension of
R, R∗, is not unique but nothing in the following arguments depends on the
particular choice of the non-standard extension of R. So fix one such extension
R∗.
Definition 29 1. x ∈ R∗, x 6= 0, is called finite if | x |< y for some y ∈ R,
or, equivalently, if | x |< n for some natural number n.
2. x ∈ R∗ is called infinitesimal if for all ǫ in R, ǫ > 0, | x |< ǫ. Following
our definition 0 is infinitesimal.
3. x ∈ V∞(R∗) is called internal if x ∈ y∗ for some y ∈ V∞(R). The set of
internal objects is denoted by V ∗∞.
4. x ∈ V∞(R∗) is standard if x = y∗ for some y ∈ V∞(R).
It follows easily, from the fact that R∗ is a proper extension of R, that there
are infinitesimal, as well as infinite, members of R∗. In fact x is infinitesimal
iff 1/x is infinite. If N is the set of natural numbers, one can show that N is
a proper subset of N∗ and every member of N∗ −N is called a non-standard
natural number.
Lemma 43 1. The sum, product and difference of two infinitesimals is in-
finitesimal.
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2. The product of an infinitesimal and a finite member of R∗ is infinitesimal.
Theorem 9 (Robinson’s Overspill Principle) Let 〈An | n ∈ N〉 be a se-
quence of members of Vk(R) for some k ∈ N. Assume also that, for all n ∈ N,
An 6= ∅ and An+1 ⊆ An. Then
⋂
n∈NA
∗
n is not empty.
Sketch of proof : Note that a sequence of elements of Vk(R) can be considered
to be a function from N into Vk(R), and therefore it is a member of V∞(R).
Hence 〈An | n ∈ N〉
∗ makes sense and it is a function from N∗ into Vk(R)
∗. Its
value at h ∈ N∗ will be denoted by (A)∗h. Note that (A)
∗
n = A
∗
n for n ∈ N. Let
h ∈ N∗−N. One can easily check, using the Leibniz principle, that (A)∗h is not
empty and that for n ∈ N (A)∗h ⊆ A
∗
n, hence
⋂
n∈NA
∗
n is not empty.
We can now define the notion of non-standard probability space, which is
like a standard (finitely additive) probability space, except that the values of
the probability function are in R∗.
Definition 30 An R∗-probability space is a triple 〈X,F , P r〉 where X is a
non-empty set , F is a Boolean subalgebra of P(X), (namely X ∈ F , ∅ ∈ F ,
and F is closed under finite unions, intersections and differences) and Pr is a
function from F into R∗ such that
1. Pr(A) ≥ 0 for A ∈ F .
2. Pr(X) = 1
3. Pr(A ∪B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) for A,B ∈ F , A and B disjoint
Note that many of the notions that are usually associated with probability
spaces are immediately generalized to R∗-probability space, like independence
of ‘events’ (namely sets in F) and conditional probability: if Pr(A) 6= 0 then
the conditional probability of B given A, is
Pr(B | A) =
Pr(A ∩B)
Pr(A)
.
See [6] for sophisticated applications of non-standard probability spaces. A
useful way of getting R∗-probability spaces is by using hyperfinite sets, sets
which are considered by R∗ to be finite.
Definition 31 An internal object A ∈ V ∗∞ is called hyperfinite iff there exists
a function f ∈ V ∗∞ and h ∈ N
∗ such that f is a 1-1 mapping of h onto A. Note
that we follow the usual set theoretical convention by which a natural number
is identified with all smaller natural numbers. Of course here we apply this
convention also to non-standard natural numbers.
52
By applying the Leibniz principle we can show that if A is hyperfinite and B
is an internal subset of A, then B is hyperfinite. Given an R∗-valued function
f which is internal, and A an hyperfinite subset of the domain of f, we can
naturally define the ‘sum’ of the values of f on A,
∑∗
x∈A f(x).
∑∗
is defined
by taking the ∗ of the standard operation of taking the sum of a finite set of
real numbers.
∑∗ shares many of the properties of its standard counterpart,
for example∑∗
x∈A∪Bf(x) =
∑∗
x∈Af(x) +
∑∗
x∈Bf(x)
for A, B hyperfinite and disjoint. The next definition generalizes the notion of
a finite probability space.
Definition 32 (Hyperfinite Probability Space) Let A ∈ V ∗∞ be an hyper-
finite set, let f be an internal R∗-valued function on A, which is not constantly
zero and such that for x ∈ A f(x) ≥ 0. Then the R∗-probability space gener-
ated by A and f (denoted by PR∗(A, f) ) is 〈A,F , P r〉 where F is the collection
of all internal subsets of A, and Pr is given by
Pr(B) =
∑∗
x∈Bf(x)∑∗
x∈Af(x)
One can verify that under the conditions of Definition 32, PR∗(A, f) is a R∗-
probability space.
B.3 Non-standard Probabilistic Models and Their Conse-
quence Relations
An R∗ probabilistic model is an R∗-probability measure on some subset M of
U . Of course, we assume that for every formula of our language, α, the set αˆ is
measurable, namely it is in F . The probability measure induces a non-standard
probability assignment to the formulas of the language by Pr(α) = Pr(αˆ). The
R∗ probabilistic modelM is said to be neat if for every formula, α, if Pr(α) = 0
then α is satisfied in no world of M.
Definition 33 1. Let M be an R∗ probabilistic model. The conditional
assertion α∼ β is valid in M, M |= α∼ β, if either Pr(α) = 0 or
the conditional probability of β given α is infinitesimally close to 1, i.e.,
1 − Pr(β | α) is infinitesimal. Note that this is equivalent to saying that
Pr(α) = 0 or Pr(¬β | α) is infinitesimal.
2. The consequence relation defined by M is:
K(M) = {α∼ β | M |= α∼ β}
Theorem 10 (Soundness for Non-standard Probabilistic Models) For ev-
ery R∗ probabilistic model M, K(M) is a rational consequence relation.
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Proof: Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, and Reflexivity are
immediate. And follows from:
Pr(¬(β ∧ γ) | α) = Pr((¬β ∨ ¬γ) | α) ≤ Pr(¬β | α) + Pr(¬γ | α)
and from the fact that the sum of two infinitesimals is infinitesimal. Or is
proved by the following manipulation:
Pr(¬γ | α ∨ β) =
Pr(¬γ ∧ (α ∨ β))
Pr(α ∨ β)
≤
Pr(¬γ ∧ α)
Pr(α ∨ β)
+
Pr(¬γ ∧ β)
Pr(α ∨ β)
≤
Pr(¬γ ∧ α)
Pr(α)
+
Pr(¬γ ∧ β)
Pr(β)
= Pr(¬γ | α) + Pr(¬γ | β)
and again using the fact that the sum of two infinitesimals is infinitesimal. We
assumed above that Pr(α) > 0 and Pr(β) > 0. If this fails then the argument is
easier. We shall proveRational Monotonicity by contradiction, so we assume
that α∼ ¬β is not in K(M), and that α∼ γ is in K(M). We shall prove that
α ∧ β∼ γ is in K(M). We can assume that Pr(α ∧ β) > 0 (hence Pr(α) > 0)
otherwise the argument is trivial.
Pr(¬γ | α ∧ β) =
Pr(¬γ ∧ α ∧ β)
Pr(α ∧ β)
=
Pr(¬γ ∧ α ∧ β)
Pr(α)
/
Pr(α ∧ β)
Pr(α)
≤
Pr(¬γ ∧ α)
Pr(α)
/
Pr(α ∧ β)
Pr(α)
=
Pr(¬γ | α) ×
1
Pr(β | α)
(21)
Since α∼ ¬β is not in K(M) , we get that Pr(β | α) is not infinitesimal, hence
1
Pr(β|α)
is finite. By Lemma 43 Pr(¬γ ∧ α) × 1
Pr(β|α)
is infinitesimal. Hence
by Equation 21, α∧β∼ γ is in K(M). Cautious Monotonicity now follows
easily. Suppose α ∼ γ and α∼ β are both in K(M). If α ∼ ¬β is not in K(M),
we conclude by Rational Monotonicity. If α ∼ ¬β is in K(M), we must have
Pr(α) = 0, since Pr(β | α) and Pr(¬β | α) cannot be both infinitesimally close
to 1. Therefore Pr(α ∧ β) = 0 and we conclude that α ∧ β ∼ γ ∈ K(M).
B.4 Completeness for the Non-Standard Probabilistic In-
terpretation
Theorem 11 Suppose the language L is countable (this assumption cannot be
dispensed with) and P is a rational consequence relation on L. Let R∗ be any
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non-standard model of analysis, then there exists an R∗-probabilistic neat model
M such that K(M) = K.
Proof: Let W = 〈S, l,≺〉, with ranking function r, be a countable (i.e., S is
countable) ranked model that defines the consequence relation P . The model
built in the proof of Theorem 5 shows that such models exist. If S is finite, or
even if each level in W is finite and W is well-founded, one may simply use the
construction described just before Lemma 22, with some arbitrary infinitesimal
ǫ. In case the model W is infinitely broad, i.e., has some level containing an
infinite number of states, then the construction has to be slightly more sophisti-
cated, but the real difficulty appears when W is not well-founded, and we have
already remarked that there are rational relations that have no well-founded
ranked model. Following the proof of Lemma 22 we would like to assign a
(non-standard) probability distribution to the states of the model in such a way
that the relative probabilty of a level to that of a lower level is infinitesimal,
but, for every formula which is satified at a given level, we would like to keep
its relative weight within the level non infinitesimal. To each formula we shall
assign a positive real number r such that, if the formula is satisfied at level l,
its relative probability within this level should be at least r. In order that these
requirements not be contradictory, the sum of the r’s so assigned should be at
most 1. Quite arbitrarily, we pick for the i-th formula r = 1/2i+1. Now we have
to show that we can find a probability assignment satisfying these requirements.
We shall define a set Bn of all probability assignments that are good up to rank
n. An assignment which is good for every n will satisfy our requirements. So,
we would like to intersect the Bn’s. The overspill principle will tell us that this
intersection is not empty.
Since S is countable we may assume that S = N. Since every countable
linear ordering may be order embedded into the real numbers, we may assume
without loss of generality that the ranking function, r, is into R. Since ≺ is a
partial ordering of N, ≺∗ is a partial ordering of N∗ which is ranked by the
ranking function r∗ mapping N∗ into R∗.
For each formula α, let Aα = (αˆ)
∗. Note that Aα is a subset of N
∗ (but
must not be a subset of N). We can now associate a world, Uh, with each
h ∈ N∗, defined by Uh |= p iff h ∈ Ap. It is easily checked that, for standard h
(i.e., h ∈ N), one has Uh = l(h) and that, for arbitrary h, Uh |= α iff h ∈ Aα.
Our idea now is to find an h in N∗ and an internal function f , from h into R∗
such that, if we consider the probability distribution given by the hyperfinite
probability space PR∗(h, f) on the set of worlds {Uk | k ∈ N∗, k < h}, we shall
get a probabilistic model whose consequence relation is exactly P (recall that
we are identifying a member of N∗ with the set of smaller members of N∗).
Fix an enumeration 〈αn | n ∈ N〉 of all the formulas of our language. For i ∈ N
let xi be the real number such that the ranking function f maps all the states
minimal in αˆi to it.
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We are now going to define a sequence of sets of possible approximations to
the object we are looking for, namely the appropriate h ∈ N∗ and the appropri-
ate f . For n ∈ N, let Bn be the set of all triples of the form (k, ǫ, f) that have
the following properties:
1. k ≥ n,
2. ǫ ∈ R, ǫ > 0, ǫ ≤ 1/n,
3. f is a function from N into R such that for any s ∈ N, f(s) > 0,
4. for any x, y ∈ R such that x < y, if x and y are in the range of the ranking
function r on k, then
∑
m<k,r(m)=y f(m)∑
m<k,r(m)=x f(m)
≤ ǫ,
5. for αi, i < k, if C = αˆi ∩ {j | r(j) = xi} ∩ {0, . . . , k − 1} 6= ∅, then
∑
m∈C,m<k f(m)∑
m<k,r(m)=xi
f(m)
≥
1
2i+1
It easily follows from the definition of the sequence of sets 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 that
Bn+1 ⊆ Bn for n ∈ N. One may also verify from item 4 that, if (k, ǫ, f) ∈ Bn
and if x is in the range of r on k, then:
∑
m<k,r(m)>x f(m)∑
m<k,r(m)=x f(m)
≤
∞∑
i=1
ǫi =
ǫ
1− ǫ
(22)
Lemma 44 For any n ∈ N, Bn 6= ∅.
Proof: The proof is essentially similar to the remarks preceding the proof of
Lemma 22 in Section 4.3. Let, indeed, Wn be the finite ranked model defined by
〈{0, . . . , n− 1},≺, l〉. We can easily arrange a probability assignment for it such
that the ratio of the probability of each rank and and each smaller rank will
be at most 1/n. Within the rank we have to satisfy item 5 in the definition of
Bn but we can easily arrange for i < n, that if αi has a non empty intersection
with this rank, then its relative probability within this rank is at least 12i+1 .
This may be arranged because
∑
i∈N
1
2i+1 = 1. If we extend this probability
assignment to any function from N into R, we see that (n, 1
n
, f) ∈ Bn.
Once we have Lemma 44 we can use Robinson’s overspill principle (Theorem
9) to show that ∩n∈NB∗n is not empty. So let (h˜, ε˜, f˜) be a member of B
∗
n for
every n ∈ N. One can easily verify that h˜ is in N∗ and that it is a non-standard
natural number: indeed for every n ∈ N, h˜ > n since (h˜, ε˜, f˜) ∈ B∗n. Similarly ε˜
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is a positive member of R∗ such that for every standard natural number n we
have ε˜ ≤ 1
n
, hence ε˜ is a positive infinitesimal. Also f˜ is a function from N∗
into the positive members of R∗, satisfying the appropriate transfer of items 5
and 4 into the context of R∗. In particular, Equation 22 carries over and we
have x = r∗(m) for some m ∈ N∗,m < h˜:
∑∗
m<h˜,r∗(m)>x
f˜(m)
∑∗
m<h˜,r∗(m)=x
f˜(m)
≤
ε˜
1− ε˜
(23)
We conclude therefore that the left-hand side of Equation 23 is infinitesimal.
We claim that the R∗ probabilistic modelM whose collection of states is h˜, i.e.,
{m | m ∈ N∗,m < h˜}, the world associated with m is Um, and the probability
measure is given by the hyperfinite probability space PR∗(h˜, f˜) is the model we
are looking for. Since any f satisfying the requirements can be multiplied by
any positive member of R∗ and still satisfies the requirements, we may assume
without loss of generality that
∑∗
m∈N∗,m<h˜
f˜(m) = 1
Note that M is a neat model since, if we have both m < h˜ and Um |= α, we
must also have Pr(α) ≥ f˜(m) > 0.
Claim 1 K(M) = K
Proof: First note that α∼ false ∈ K(M) iff α∼ false ∈ K. If α∼ false ∈ K,
then Aα = ∅, hence {m | m ∈ N∗,U |= α} = ∅. Therefore α∼ false ∈ K(M).
For the other direction, if α∼ false 6∈ K, then, for some m ∈ N, Um |= α. But
m, being a standard natural number, is less than h˜, hence some state in M
satisfies α. By the neatness ofM, α∼ false 6∈ K(M). By the previous remark,
we can now assume that α∼ false 6∈ K, hence αˆ 6= ∅. Let m ∈ N be minimal
in αˆ and let x = r(m). Let i ∈ N be such that α = αi−1. In particular we have:
(∀y ∈ R)(y < x⇒ r−1(y) ∩ αˆ) = ∅.
Using the Leibniz principle we get:
{m | m ∈ N∗,m < h˜,Um |= α} ⊆ {m | m ∈ N
∗, r∗(m) ≥ x}.
Let us define now
η =
∑∗
m∈h˜,r∗(m)>x
f˜(m)
and
ρ =
∑∗
m∈h˜,r∗(m)=x
f˜(m).
57
For every formula γ define:
λ(γ) =
∑∗
m∈h˜,r∗(m)=x,Um|=γ
f˜(m)
Of course one always has Pr(γ) ≥ λ(γ). Note that by Equation 23, η/ρ is
infinitesimal. Also by item 5 of the definition of the sequence 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 if
Aγ ∩ {m | m ∈ h˜, r
∗(m) = x} 6= ∅ and if γ = αj−1, j ∈ N then
λ(γ) ≥ ρ×
1
2j
.
Now, assume α∼ β ∈ K. Hence for every m ∈ h˜, if U |= ¬β ∧ α, we must have
r∗(m) > x. Therefore Pr(¬β ∧ α) ≤ η. Therefore:
Pr(¬β | α) =
Pr(¬β ∧ α)
Pr(α)
≤
η
ρ× 12i
= 2i ×
η
ρ
.
Therefore Pr(¬β | α) is infinitesimal and by definition α∼ β ∈ K(M). If α∼ β 6∈ K,
then somem ∈ N, r∗(m) = x satisfies Um |= ¬β ∧ α. But thism satisfiesm ∈ h˜,
so it is in our model. Let j ∈ N be such that ¬β ∧ α = αj−1. Since we clearly
have: Pr(α) ≤ ρ+ η, we also have:
Pr(¬β | α) =
Pr(¬β ∧ α)
Pr(α)
≥
1
2j × ρ
ρ+ η
≥
1
2j+1
since obviously ρ ≥ η. So Pr(¬β | α) is not infinitesimal and α∼ β 6∈ K(M).
(end of proof of Claim 1)
We have already noticed thatM is a neat model. Claim 1 shows that it has
the desired property. (end of proof of Theorem 11)
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